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CHARTER CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
THE MYTH OF EDWARD COKE AND THE 
VIRGINIA CHARTER* 
MARY SARAH BILDER** 
 
[A]ll and every the persons being our subjects	.	.	.	and every of 
their children, which shall happen to be born within	.	.	.	the said 
several colonies	.	.	.	shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises 
and immunities	.	.	.	as if they had been abiding and born, within 
this our realm of England	.	.	.	.—Virginia Charter (1606)1 
Magna Carta’s connection to the American constitutional 
tradition has been traced to Edward Coke’s insertion of English 
liberties in the 1606 Virginia Charter. This account curiously 
turns out to be unsupported by direct evidence. This Article 
recounts an alternative history of the origins of English liberties 
in American constitutionalism. A quarter century before the 
Virginia charter, provisions assuring liberties to English children 
born overseas were inserted in the earliest letters patent. These 
provisions drew on an older practice extending liberties to 
children born overseas. Because of these provisions, persons 
born in the colonies were guaranteed the same liberties as those 
born in England. This explanation suggests new appreciation for 
the interpretive flexibility of early written constitutionalism. As 
the liberties provisions reveal, words described the underlying 
concept but were not used to fix a precise definition. Thus, 
various words could be altered over time to ensure that the 
concept adapted to contemporary political and legal issues. 
Throughout, however, the assurance remained that those born in 
the colonies possessed English liberties. This Article calls this 
genre of early written constitutionalism “charter 
constitutionalism” to emphasize this elastic interpretive practice. 
 
 *  © 2016 Mary Sarah Bilder. 
 **  My thanks to Alfred Brophy, John Orth, and the other attendees; Mollie 
Hammond, Kelli Farrington, and Laurel Davis, who helped locate difficult library 
materials; Warren Billings and Robert Palmer, who assisted with the original Virginia 
charter; Frank Herrmann, who translated the Raleigh patent draft; and Hannah Farhan 
and John Joy, who assisted with research. 
 1. SAMUEL M. BEMISS, THE THREE CHARTERS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF 
LONDON 9 (1957) (spelling modernized). 
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Charter constitutionalism deserves recognition as a founding 
strand of American constitutionalism. 
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I.  MAGNA CARTA AND THE VIRGINIA CHARTER 
In Obergefell v. Hodges,2 Justice Anthony Kennedy gave a nod 
to the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta. Three times in the opinion, 
he referred to the U.S. Constitution as a “charter.”3 His interpretive 
stance on the Fourteenth Amendment grew from his understanding 
of a charter tradition. He wrote: 
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the 
extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted 
to future generations a charter protecting the right of all 
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.4 
To Justice Kennedy, a charter—written over time by a 
community—guaranteed liberty. To some readers, Justice Kennedy’s 
 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 3. Id. at 2598; id. at 2602 (“With that knowledge must come the recognition that laws 
excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind 
prohibited by our basic charter.”); id. at 2605 (“The Nation’s courts are open to injured 
individuals who come to them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic 
charter.”). For other Justice Kennedy references to Magna Carta, see, for example, Dep’t 
of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1243 n.1 (2015) (referring to Magna 
Carta, chapter 39); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008) (tracing the writ of 
habeas corpus to Magna Carta, chapter 39); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 
U.S. 261, 284 (1997) (tracing rights to navigable waters to Magna Carta). 
 4. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
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sentence embodies modern liberal interpretive approaches to the 
Constitution. Its roots, however, may be in the history of American 
constitutionalism when written charters established the governance of 
the earliest English settlements. This Article retells the story of the 
most famous clause in the colonial charters—the one assuring English 
liberties to English colonists—as evidence of an early practice of 
written constitutionalism that I call “charter constitutionalism.” 
The connection between Magna Carta and our Constitution has 
intrigued scholars.5 Magna Carta was composed eight centuries ago 
for a political and economic world that seems the antithesis of 
modern American values. As scholars point out, the historical 
thirteenth-century document bears little resemblance to the myth of 
Magna Carta.6 The conventional explanation of the relationship 
between Magna Carta and the U.S. Constitution emphasizes concepts 
(part of the “myth”) embodied in Magna Carta, regardless of the 
precise terms of its provisions. Trial by jury, due process, 
representation for taxation, even the very idea of enforcing 
boundaries on governmental authority—these fundamental ideas of 
American constitutionalism are given greater legitimacy by growing 
out of ancient constitutional roots.7 The myth of Magna Carta often 
has been viewed as, at worst, harmless, and at best, the very source of 
expanding American rights and liberties.8 
 
 5. See, e.g., A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA 
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1, 6, 370–82 (1968); NICHOLAS VINCENT, 
MAGNA CARTA: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 93 (2012); Matthew Shaw, Colonies and 
Revolutions, in MAGNA CARTA: LAW, LIBERTY, LEGACY 137, 137–55 (Claire Breay & 
Julian Harrison eds., 2015). 
 6. See CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA: MANUSCRIPTS AND MYTHS 47–48 (2002); 
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 39, 48 (3d ed. 2015) (“The ‘myth’ of Magna Carta, that 
interpretation of it which gives it qualities which the men of 1215 did not intend, was part 
of the document’s potential.”); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: LEGEND AND 
LEGACY ix (1965). For attribution of the “myth” metaphor to Edward Jenks, see Max 
Radin, The Myth of Magna Carta, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1060–61 (1947). 
 7. See G.R.C. DAVIS, MAGNA CARTA 9 (1963); HOWARD, supra note 5, at 371–82; 
DAVID STARKEY, MAGNA CARTA: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE CHARTER 153–55 
(2015); CAROLINE P. STOEL & ANN B. CLARKE, MAGNA CARTA TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
LIBERTY UNDER THE LAW 9–11 (1986); VINCENT, supra note 5, at 4, 96–97 (2012). 
 8. Two refreshing counterexamples to the notion that the Magna Carta myth is 
merely harmless were presented at the Symposium by Paul Babie and Mary Ziegler. See 
generally Paul Babie, Magna Carta and the Forest Charter: Two Stories of Property, What 
Will You be Doing in 2017?, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2016) (noting that failing to 
consider Magna Carta in conjunction with the Forest Charter leads to a forgotten legacy of 
“community and obligations that balances [Magna Carta’s] legacy of individual rights”); 
Mary Ziegler, The Conservative Magna Carta, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1654 (2016) 
(discussing how social conservatives weave Magna Carta into their arguments that seek to 
resist the “tyranny of the government and the courts”).  
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But there is another, smaller myth buried within the 
conventional account of Magna Carta in America. This myth explains 
how Magna Carta became part of American constitutionalism. 
Conventional accounts connect Magna Carta by means of an explicit, 
intentional decision of one man to insert English liberties into the 
early Virginia charter. This origin story appears, for example, in the 
aptly titled book, Magna Carta to the Constitution, where the 1606 
Virginia charter is described as “the first colonial document based in 
part on Magna Carta.”9 It “extended the king’s law to Englishmen 
abroad.”10 The “guarantees spelled out in the first Virginia Charter 
were inherent in Magna Carta.”11 Moreover, this story gives a single 
person responsibility for the charter and its inclusion of liberties: 
Edward Coke. According to this story, Coke caused Magna Carta to 
cross the Atlantic, thereby influencing the development of American 
constitutionalism. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the major Magna Carta exhibits 
tell this story of Edward Coke and the 1606 Virginia charter. The 
British Library catalog explains: 
Virginia was the first permanent English colony in North 
America, established by the London Company in 1607. The 
foundation charter of that new colony, drafted by Sir Edward 
Coke (d. 1634), stated that English law should be applied to the 
settlers.12 
The Library of Congress catalog similarly states: 
In 1606 King James I granted a charter to the Virginia 
Company to establish a commercial settlement in North 
America. The charter, drafted by Sir Edward Coke, who had 
heavily invested in the scheme to develop colonies in North 
America, extended the privileges and liberties of English 
subjects to the inhabitants of the Virginia colonies and their 
descendants.13 
Accordingly, the fundamental liberties guaranteed by Magna Carta 
exist in the United States because one man—Edward Coke—
 
 9. STOEL & CLARKE, supra note 7, at 35. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Shaw, supra note 5, at 142. 
 13. LIBRARY CONG., MAGNA CARTA: MUSE AND MENTOR 16 (2014), 
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-carta-muse-and-mentor/rights-of-englishmen-in-
british-america.html#obj022 [http://perma.cc/T6VB-H2TD]. 
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deliberately placed them in the first constitutional document—the 
1606 Virginia charter. 
The 1606 Virginia charter appears amenable to this 
interpretation as the linchpin connecting Magna Carta to American 
constitutionalism. The crucial language in the liberties provision 
states: 
Also we	.	.	.	declare	.	.	.	that	.	.	.	persons being our subjects, 
which shall dwell and inhabit within	.	.	.	the said several colonies 
and plantations, and every of their children, which shall happen 
to be born within	.	.	.	the said several colonies and plantations, 
shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities, 
within any of our other dominions, to all intents and purposes, 
as if they had been abiding and born, within this our realm of 
England, or any other of our said dominions.14 
The charter guarantees that those born to subjects in the colonies 
would have legal rights as if they had been born in England. Birth in 
Virginia would be the same as birth in England. Magna Carta’s 
liberties apply to the English in America just as they did to those in 
England. 
Beyond the claim of a direct causal connection, this foundational 
story contains two other assumptions. These assumptions, ironically, 
reinforce a constrained understanding of American constitutionalism. 
First, by focusing on the specific words of the Virginia charter, the 
story implies that the precise text mattered. That is, the Virginia 
charter provision is interpreted with modern textualist 
understandings. Second, and relatedly, by insisting on an agent 
(Edward Coke), the story implies that the provision reflects specific 
intent. Thus, although the origin story takes place in the early 
seventeenth century, it incorporates two modern beliefs about 
American constitutionalism. American written constitutionalism, 
even in its earliest glimpses, is viewed as textual and as the product of 
intent. Unintentionally, this small myth about the origin of American 
liberties leads us to believe that written constitutionalism, even four 
centuries ago, reflected certain late nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
ideas about the nature of American constitutionalism. 
 
 14. BEMISS, supra note 1, at 9 (modernized spelling). For a contemporaneous copy, 
see Digital Images of the 1606 Virginia Charter, U. HOUS., http://aalt.law.uh.edu/AALT7
/C66/C66no1709/ [http://perma.cc/9GEN-X9CJ]. My thanks to Professor Robert Palmer 
for providing digital images. The original charter given to the patentees has never been 
located. See BEMISS, supra note 1, at vii. 
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The history of the origin of American written constitutionalism is 
a historical inquiry far lengthier than can be summarized here, but a 
few words usefully situate the problem posed by the early colonial 
charters. The general transformation seems obvious: English 
constitutionalism was not based on a single, written fundamental law; 
American constitutionalism becomes defined by that concept. We 
know something changed about the way that people imagined 
constitutionalism between the late sixteenth century when colonial 
settlements begin and the late eighteenth century when American 
written constitutions begin to assume recognizable forms. But it is 
surprisingly difficult to explain the change with precision and 
persuasive power. The beginning of this subtle transformation 
occurred in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries as the 
idea of a written constitution as a genre emerged slowly and 
tantalizingly from older understandings of constitutionalism.15 
Various analytical dichotomies have been used to explain the 
apparent shift: from ancient to modern constitutions; from unwritten 
to written constitutions; from little “c” to big “C” constitutions; from 
colonial (or transatlantic or imperial) constitutionalism to American 
Constitutionalism.16 Across these accounts, the colonial charters 
 
 15. See Mary Sarah Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law 
[hereinafter Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law], in 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. 
HORWITZ 25, 28 (Alfred L. Brophy & Daniel W. Hamilton eds., 2009). 
 16. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 175–97 (1967) (describing the shift to “the concept of a fixed, written 
constitution”); MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: 
COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE 1–2 (2004) (describing various meanings 
of “constitution”); DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, 
at 5–10 (2005) (describing the evolving definition of “constitution”); GORDON WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 259–68 (rev. ed. 1998) (describing written 
and unwritten constitutionalism). See generally CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (photo. reprint 2007) (1940) (describing 
the shift from ancient to modern constitutionalism); Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and 
Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 28 n.4 (discussing the small “c” to large “C” shift); 
Ken MacMillan, Imperial Constitutions: Sovereignty and Law in the British Atlantic, in 
BRITAIN’S OCEANIC EMPIRE: ATLANTIC AND INDIAN OCEAN WORLDS, 1550–1850, at 
69, 69 (H.V. Bowen et al. eds., 2012) (arguing “that historians should begin thinking about 
‘transoceanic’ imperial constitutions rather than bifurcated ‘Atlantic’ and ‘Asiatic’ 
models”); Gerald Stourzh, Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early 
Seventeenth to the Late Eighteenth Century, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 35, 35 (Terence Ball & J. G. A. Pocock eds., 1988) (reviewing various 
categories). 
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alluringly appear as the first glimpse of the belief that constitutional 
concepts could be embodied in a written form.17 
Similarly, although Magna Carta appears somehow relevant to 
the shift to written constitutionalism, the connection has proven 
difficult to precisely identify. Although English or British 
constitutionalism is usually described as unwritten, Magna Carta 
represents an anomalous, yet fundamental, written component of that 
tradition. Moreover, viewed as a written document, its words—
predominantly replaced, reinterpreted, or repealed—were not 
interpreted in the manner of modern constitutions. And, its 
placement in English statute books defies American law’s strict 
division between statutory and constitutional law. Finally, its cultural 
persistence, often as an extra-legal oppositional claim when 
conventional legal sources fail, makes it difficult to categorize as 
binding fundamental law. Magna Carta is somehow connected to 
American constitutionalism in the early colonial period—but 
precisely why that happens remains obscure. 
This Article retells the history of the Virginia charter to 
illuminate a path of connection from Magna Carta to the early 
American colonial charters and then to American constitutionalism. 
Two linguistic problems immediately confront this inquiry. What 
should we call the early genre of constitutionalism that existed in the 
legal imagination of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century 
participants? And, what should we call the relevant phrase describing 
liberties in the colonial charters? To use a modern constitutional 
vocabulary implies that current categories and boundaries existed in a 
world where they did not. To use ahistorical ideas involves the 
problem that no one in the past would recognize the name of the 
concept. On balance, naming the concepts using modern terminology 
seems more useful for explanatory convenience. 
This Article uses the term charter constitutionalism to describe 
the type of constitutionalism that appears in the late sixteenth- and 
early seventeenth-century colonial charters. This term is 
anachronistic. As I have noted in previous scholarship, the earliest 
charters were referred to as letters patent, not charters.18 They were 
not referred to as constitutional documents, and many provisions in 
 
 17. See, e.g., JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 3 (1923) (“These charters 
were in the strict sense written law.”). 
 18. Mary Sarah Bilder, English Settlement and Local Governance [hereinafter Bilder, 
English Settlement and Local Governance], in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN 
AMERICA 63, 65–66 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); Bilder, 
Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 31–36. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1545 (2016) 
1552 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
these documents were not interpreted as constitutional in nature. This 
term, however, emphasizes that people did view certain provisions as 
embodying fundamental law. And, in contrast to some modern 
definitions of constitutionalism, charter constitutionalism can help us 
accept a different group of interpretive possibilities. This early 
approach to written constitutionalism emerged with a different 
assumption about the purpose of the written words. The specific 
words and the underlying concept were not in complete 
correspondence. This assumption resonated with the cultural 
perception of Magna Carta as a written document of underlying 
concepts. In fact, the preference during this period for spelling Magna 
Carta as Magna Charta visually underscored the centrality of the idea 
of a charter as a particular constitutional genre. Charters were a 
foundational genre in the transformation from unwritten to written 
constitutionalism.19 
I similarly use the term “liberties assurance” to describe the 
charter provisions that sought to provide those born in the colonies 
with the same liberties as those born in England or the dominions.20 
These provisions were surprisingly vague with respect to what was 
being described, for what purposes, and in comparison to whom. 
Christopher Tomlins accurately describes this complexity of the basic 
concept when he refers to “more generally the actual compass of ‘as 
if’—that is, of English law (liberties, franchises, immunities) outside 
the realm of England.”21 Sometimes the concept has been 
summarized as the “rights of Englishmen”—but “rights” is too 
narrow.22 “Liberties” reminds us that we are in an earlier moment, 
with the caveat that “liberties” was not the only word used. 
“Assurance” emphasizes that these provisions are not easily 
categorized within modern distinctions (for example, aspirational 
promises, positive legal grants, or confirmatory declarations of 
 
 19. See Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, supra note 15, at 35 
(describing the preferred seventeenth-century Charta spelling with its “visual insistence on 
charter”). 
 20. See Elizabeth Mancke, The Languages of Liberty in British North America, 1607–
1776, in EXCLUSIONARY EMPIRE: ENGLISH LIBERTY OVERSEAS, 1600–1900, at 25, 25 
(Jack P. Greene ed., 2010) (stating that the “charters acknowledged that overseas English 
subjects were entitled to traditional English legal and political protections”). 
 21. CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY 
IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865, at 83 (2010). 
 22. See HOWARD, supra note 5, at 24–25; see also Justin Champion, From Liber 
Homo to ‘Free-born Englishman’: How Magna Carta Became a ‘Liberty Document’, 1508–
1760s, in MAGNA CARTA: THE FOUNDATION OF FREEDOM, 1215–2015, at 102, 103–19 
(Nicholas Vincent ed., 2015); LIBRARY CONG., supra note 13, at 16 (titling section on 
Virginia charter and Coke, “Rights of Englishmen in British America”). 
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existing law). Indeed, it seems every word used was open-ended and 
defined only in reference to something else. A person was not 
declared to be a “subject.” A person was not given X liberties (or 
rights or privileges or franchises). A person was not even described as 
having been born in the realm. Instead, a person was assured a body 
of legal benefits (alternatively called privileges, liberties, franchises, 
or immunities) as if the person had been born in a certain relationship 
to the Crown usually defined by geography (the realms of England 
and Ireland or any other place in allegiance to the Crown). The 
“liberties assurance” describes this referential concept.23 
This Article challenges both the idea of the Virginia charter as 
the connection between Magna Carta and American 
constitutionalism and the modern constitutional assumptions 
underlying the traditional historical account. In so doing, it seeks to 
expand our ideas about our written constitutional heritage. In an 
influential article on Edward Coke’s constitutionalism, law professor 
Daniel Hulsebosch pointed to the difficulty Americans have with the 
“notion of a framer in a legal world without a unitary, written 
constitution.”24 This Article takes Hulsebosch’s insight in a different 
direction by arguing that a community over time can frame a 
constitutional concept. The story in these pages reveals a 
constitutional provision (the liberties assurance) arising from a 
community of legal actors.25 The inherent ambiguities and 
overlapping understandings of a community explain the resilience of 
the provision. An enduring concept, existing across varied semantic 
expressions, was the essence of charter constitutionalism. 
This Article proceeds by revisiting the traditional account of the 
Virginia charter and then describing an alternate history. Part II 
traces the conventional narrative in which Edward Coke endowed the 
American colonists with the rights of Englishmen by drafting the 
 
 23. An analogous approach was used in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Act of Apr. 
9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at	42 U.S.C. §§	1981–1982 (2006)) (“That 
all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding 
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such 
citizens, of every race and color	.	.	.	shall have the same right, in every State and Territory 
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, 
and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 24. Daniel Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir 
Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 444 (2003). 
 25. See infra Section III.A. 
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Virginia charter. The first Section of Part II describes the traditional 
account; the second Section argues that the evidence for the account 
is tenuous. Part III offers an alternative narrative. The first Section of 
Part III argues that the liberties assurance was the result of collective 
creation by a large group of late sixteenth-century Elizabethans. The 
second Section argues that the concept of the liberties assurance 
arose even earlier and that the language drew on long experience with 
efforts to ensure the legal status of children born overseas. The third 
Section traces the liberties assurance from its earliest appearance in the 
1578 letters patent to Humphrey Gilbert through to the 1732 Georgia 
charter. The final Part offers a few brief reflections on the importance 
of charter constitutionalism for American constitutionalism. 
II.  THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN AND EDWARD COKE 
The conventional narrative connects the expansion to America 
of the rights of Englishmen through Edward Coke. Supporting this 
story has been the apparent confluence of historical events—the 1606 
Virginia charter, Edward Coke’s status of Attorney General in 1606, 
his important opinion in Calvin’s Case (1608), and his later advocacy 
of Magna Carta.26 Different strands of this story can be found in 
explanations about the legality of the American Revolution, the 
development of colonial law, and the history of American 
citizenship.27 Scholarly repetition of the story, however, has not made 
its essential connections any firmer. 
A. Edward Coke and the Charter 
For the past century, various accounts of the 1606 Virginia 
charter have attributed the document to Edward Coke. Coke’s 
appearance is curious. His responsibility is presented with caveats. 
His precise role is often left somewhat vague. Nonetheless, the early 
seventeenth-century progenitor of English liberties serves in these 
accounts as a framing agent for American liberties. 
Over a century ago, the basic narrative connecting the Virginia 
charter to American constitutionalism appeared in an influential 
article by Harold Hazeltine, Downing Professor of the Laws of 
 
 26. See generally Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377; 7 
Co. Rep. 1 b (listing Coke as Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas). 
 27. See, e.g., JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 
1608–1870, at 7–9, 13–61 (1978); TOMLINS, supra note 21, at 156–90; CRAIG YIRUSH, 
SETTLERS, LIBERTY, AND EMPIRE: THE ROOTS OF EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THEORY, 1675–1775, at 7–11 (2011); Barbara A. Black, Constitution of Empire: The Case 
for the Colonists, 124	U. PA. L. REV.	1157, 1207–11 (1976). 
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England at Cambridge.28 Hazeltine focused on the “claim of the 
colonists that they possessed the rights of Englishmen.”29 The “solid 
documentary basis” for the claim was the “solemn enunciation of the 
principle in royal charters.”30 The charters were “the earliest written 
constitutions of the colonies.”31 The 1606 Virginia charter deserved 
particular praise. Hazeltine declared: 
In this famous document—the final form of which was in part 
the work of Coke himself—the King not only claimed the right 
to colonize a large portion of the territory of the New World, 
but he also asserted the principle that English colonists in this 
territory were to enjoy the same constitutional rights possessed 
by Englishmen in the home-land.32 
Hazeltine left Coke’s contribution slightly vague (“in part the work of 
Coke himself”).33 The argument, however, created the impression 
that Coke had been the one to assert the principle that the charters 
extended constitutional rights of Englishmen to the colonists.34 
Edward Coke’s potential influence proved understandably 
irresistible to Professor A.E. Dick Howard in his influential 1968 
book on Magna Carta and American constitutionalism, The Road 
from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America.35 
Howard explained that the “Virginia Charter of 1606 takes on even 
greater significance when one considers that the text of the charter 
may well have been scrutinized by the sometime English Attorney 
General Edward Coke	.	.	.	.”36 Eliding over the “may well have” 
caution, Howard declared, “[t]he guarantee of the rights of 
Englishmen would have had special significance to Coke, who was to 
 
 28. See generally H. D. Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on American 
Constitutional Development, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1917) (“The earliest and perhaps the 
most important phase of this imperial history of Magna Carta is its effect upon the 
constitutions and laws of the American Colonies and of the Federal Union that was 
established after their War of Independence.”). 
 29. Id. at 8. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 6–7 (noting that “the Elizabethan patents to Gilbert and Raleigh” had 
“embodied” the principle but it was “not until after James’s patent to the Virginia 
Company that the principle first took root in American soil”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. The link is explicit in a footnote: “On the charters as the earliest American 
constitutions and as the foundation of the constitutions of the national era	.	.	.	.” Id. at 8 
n.8. 
 35. HOWARD, supra note 5, at 14–34. 
 36. Id. at 18 (noting possible participation of Sir John Dodderidge, Solicitor General, 
and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere). 
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become the great seventeenth-century expositor of the common 
law.”37 Howard then connected Coke to American constitutionalism: 
“And it was Coke who was to have such dramatic influence on the 
course of American legal and constitutional thought	.	.	.	.”38 The 
charter, Coke, and constitutionalism were again connected. 
The narrative achieved dominance when Nicholas Vincent 
adopted it in 2012 in his widely read Magna Carta: A Very Short 
Introduction. Magna Carta embodied “the idea of a charter of 
liberties, embodying the subject’s rights against the sovereign.”39 This 
idea underlaid “the chartered privileges which kings themselves 
continued to grant, not least to the fledgling American colonies.”40 
For Vincent, there was an irony to the connection because “Magna 
Carta and the principles of English liberty were exported across the 
north Atlantic” by “precisely those Stuart Kings, James I and Charles 
I, who were elsewhere accused of suborning [sic] the ancient 
constitution.”41 Coke was perhaps the explanation. Vincent stated 
that “Coke played a part in drafting the first charter of the Virginia 
Company in 1606, promising colonists ‘all liberties, franchises and 
immunities	.	.	.	as if they had been abiding and born within this our 
realm of England.’	”42 Once again, we have the same story: Magna 
Carta, Coke, the charter, and, eventually, American 
constitutionalism. 
The narrative has proven alluring to recent scholars tracing the 
development of other fundamental strands of colonial American law, 
and in particular to those focusing on the influence of Calvin’s Case.43 
In 1608, Coke published his opinion in the case involving the status of 
Scottish subjects of James VI of Scotland (after his accession to the 
British crown as James I), particularly the Scots’ rights to inherit and 
 
 37. Id.; see also id. at 15 n.4 (focusing on “significant language” of liberties assurance 
and relegating “like provisions” of earlier patents to footnote mention). 
 38. Id. at 18–19 (noting that Coke “later wrote the famous Institutes on the laws of 
England, in which he said that any statute passed by Parliament contrary to Magna Carta, 
the cornerstone of the rights of Englishmen, should be ‘holden for none’ ”). 
 39. VINCENT, supra note 5, at 93. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Harvey Wheeler, Calvin’s Case (1608) and the McIlwain-Schuyler 
Debate, 61 AM. HIST. REV. 587, 597 (1956) (summarizing a colonial American debate 
between McIlwain and Schuyler relating to Calvin’s Case). For a different approach 
connecting Coke, constitutionalism, and the November 1606 Articles, Instructions, and 
Orders, see David Thomas Konig, Colonization and the Common Law in Ireland and 
Virginia, 1569–1634, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: 
SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY 70, 81 (James A. Henretta et al. eds., 1991) 
(describing Coke’s common law principle of interpreting charters “fully and beneficially”). 
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own land in England and to take advantage of other privileges of the 
laws of England.44 As Steve Sheppard notes, the case “had 
tremendous implications for James’s view of forging a single nation of 
Great Britain, as well as for the rights of subjects living in the new 
colonies overseas.”45 It is not surprising therefore that the Coke–
Virginia charter story appears in the scholarship related to Calvin’s 
Case. In exploring the origins of birthright citizenship, Polly Price 
connected the case to Coke, the Virginia charter, and the rights of 
Englishmen.46 In arguing for Coke’s importance in conceptualizing 
the legal status of the colonies, Daniel Hulsebosch linked the case to 
Coke and the charter.47 In Christopher Tomlins’s Bancroft Prize–
winning book on English settlement, he traced connections among 
the case, Coke, and the earliest charters in a section entitled “Natural 
Subjects and Free Denizens—Calvin’s Case.”48 Similarly, Ken 
Macmillan interwove the case, the 1606 Virginia charter “possibly 
authored by Coke, who was Attorney General until July 1606[,]”49 
and the provisions of the early charters in the most detailed recent 
work on imperial constitutionalism.50 The important connection to 
Magna Carta is made apparent in Macmillan’s comment: 
As Coke, Hale, and later writers such as John Locke and 
William Blackstone explained, in exchange for their allegiance, 
those living in the colonies retained basic rights to life, limb, 
health, reputation, property, and protection that all subjects 
enjoyed as part of their English subjecthood and as guaranteed 
by natural law.51 
 
 44. Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 380–82; 7 Co. 
Rep. 1 b, 2 b–4 b (deciding that Scots born after James’s succession (the postnati) were 
English subjects; however, those born before (the antenati) were not). 
 45. Id. at 166. 
 46. Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 74 (1997) (noting that “two years prior	.	.	.	the English King 
granted to the colonists of Virginia a charter that guaranteed them the ‘rights’ of 
Englishmen”). 
 47. Hulsebosch, supra note 24, at 460 (noting that Coke “had drafted the company’s 
original charter, and the dicta in his opinion contained a disquisition of the legal 
relationship between the realm of England and other royal dominions”); see also Liam 
Séamus O’Melinn, American Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Seventeenth-Century 
West Indies, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 121 n.88 (1995) (stating that “when Coke drafted the 
Virginia charter of 1606 he intended to safeguard the colonists in their privileges”). 
 48. TOMLINS, supra note 21, 82–89. 
 49. KEN MACMILLAN, THE ATLANTIC IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION: CENTER AND 
PERIPHERY IN THE ENGLISH ATLANTIC WORLD 25 (2011) [hereinafter MACMILLAN, 
THE ATLANTIC IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION]. 
 50. See id. at 15–16, 25–27. 
 51. Id. at 27. 
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As he notes, this collection of rights had been the “unique marker of 
English identity since the Magna Carta.”52 To write about Calvin’s 
Case in the American colonial context seems to require repetition of 
the claim that Magna Carta’s liberties extend to American soil 
through the early colonial charters. 
The seductive nature of this narrative reflects our desires for the 
origins of American constitutionalism. The written charters are seen 
as shadowy versions of early American constitutions. Rights language 
appears because of the influence and deliberate decision of one of the 
greatest of early English legal thinkers and jurists. The language is 
intentional, that is, it is designed to extend rights symbolized by 
Magna Carta to English colonists in America. The language is also 
positivist, that is, there is no uncertainty about whether in the absence 
of the words the same rights would have been extended. It is 
ultimately an almost heroic, reassuring narrative about the 800-year-
old genealogy of American constitutional rights. 
B. Uncertain Connections 
Despite the understandable appeal of the narrative, the 
supporting evidence is more tenuous than prior academic embrace 
considers. As this Section explores, no known evidence establishes 
Coke’s actual drafting of the charter. 
Coke’s responsibility for the 1606 Virginia charter has been 
assumed because of his role as attorney general during the granting of 
the Virginia charter. The charter was granted on April 10, 1606.53 
Coke was Attorney General from April 1594 to June 1606, when he 
became Chief Justice of Common Pleas.54 Despite secondary accounts 
describing Coke’s assistance in the charter process,55 his personal 
involvement is not based on any direct evidence from Coke’s papers.56 
 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. See BEMISS, supra note 1, at 1. 
 54. Edward Coke, 1 SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE xxxix, xlvi (Steve 
Sheppard ed., 2003). 
 55. See, e.g., id. at xlv (“Coke assists Popham in drafting the First Royal Charter of 
the new Virginia Company, a charter that assures that British subjects in the colony and 
their children born there ‘shall have and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities, 
within any of our other Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding 
and born, within this our Realm of England, or any other of our said Dominions.’ This 
promise is renewed in the Charter of 1609 and later charters.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Finbarr McCarthy, Participatory Government and Communal Property: 
Two Radical Concepts in the Virginia Charter of 1606, 29	U. RICH. L. REV.	327, 340, 342 
n.54 (1995) (describing Alexander Brown and Charles Andrews as sources). Andrews 
simply states that “the text was undoubtedly scrutinized” by Coke and Dodderidge. 1 
CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 85 (1934). 
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The Privy Council registers for these years were destroyed in a fire in 
1619.57 And no draft of the Virginia charter—never mind one with 
Coke’s handwriting—has been found. Instead, earlier scholars 
extrapolated from the general drafting process and surmised Coke’s 
involvement. 
Relatively little scholarship exists on the drafting of the letters 
patent and colonial charters.58 A letters patent was an official 
document from the crown, in these instances, authorizing the 
colonization of areas at the time not known to or populated by the 
British. The process apparently remained the same over the centuries: 
interested parties filed a petition; a warrant was created with 
instructions; and the attorney general and solicitor general reviewed 
the draft, as did the Privy Council.59 Surviving manuscripts indicate 
that, in some instances, certain attorneys general (including Coke) 
made additions to letters patent.60 For example, in 1619, records 
revealed Coke looked at the patent for a company planning to settle 
the country near the Amazon.61 It is certainly possible that Coke as 
attorney general had some role in the Virginia charter. Nevertheless, 
it is equally likely that the general drafting was largely complete 
before the attorney general’s review. The attorney general was not 
 
Alexander Brown cites only to the Deane article which only lays out the letters patent 
process. 1 ALEXANDER BROWN, THE GENESIS OF THE UNITED STATES vi–vii (1890). 
Indeed, Brown writes, “I think” the first draft “was drawn by Sir John Popham” but then 
“subject to alterations” as it passed through various hands. Id. The Deane article was itself 
based only on a general description of the letters patent process in the nineteenth century 
by the Public Records Keeper. See Charles Deane, The Forms in Issuing Letters-Patent by 
the Crown of England, in MASS. HIST. SOC’Y, 11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY 166, 167–69 (1871). 
 57. Privy Council: Registers (PC2), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery
.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11475 [http://perma.cc/W8U4-2CN9]. 
 58. See, e.g., Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, supra note 15, 
at 32–33; Bilder, English Settlement and Local Governance, supra note 18, at 65–67; 
MACMILLAN, THE ATLANTIC IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 49, at 23; KEN 
MACMILLAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION IN THE ENGLISH NEW WORLD: THE 
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE, 1576–1640, at 79–120 (2006) [hereinafter 
MACMILLAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION]. For support of the idea that companies 
kept records of useful patent language, see discussion of Presidents of Patents, Grants & 
Commissioners by the Virginia Company (July 1, 1622), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON 64, 67 (Susan M. Kingsbury ed., 1906). 
 59. DEANE, supra note 56, at 167–69 (citing SECOND REPORT OF THE DEPUTY 
KEEPER OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS (May 15, 1841)) (describing the patent process in 
detail). 
 60. EDWARD HUGHES, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE, 1558–1825, at 
77–79 (1934). 
 61. ENGLISH AND IRISH SETTLEMENT ON THE RIVER AMAZON, 1550–1646, at 191 
(Joyce Lorimer ed., 1989) (acknowledging the participation of both Coke and the Master 
of the Rolls in the patent certification process). 
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tasked individually with drawing the original letters patent;62 instead, 
because a letters patent was based on a warrant containing 
instructions, “the substance had been determined in advance.”63 
Therefore, the patentees themselves often likely prepared initial 
drafts. Coke’s drafting of the liberties assurance for Virginia would 
have been unusual. 
Further, little about Coke’s biography suggests any particular 
interest in the colonies. At a time when so many other legal figures 
appear as advisors, investors, or participants in the early English 
settlements, biographers and scholars have not emphasized evidence 
of Coke’s personal involvement.64 Even among the many investors 
listed in the second Virginia charter, Coke’s name does not appear.65 
His compatriot, Chief Justice John Popham, provides a useful 
contrast. Popham was fascinated by and involved in early colonial 
settlement efforts. Popham’s biographer included a chapter entitled 
“Virginia Planter” and subtitled the book, “Leading to the 
Establishment of the First English Colony in New England.”66 In 
contrast, Coke’s interest appears to have been relatively nonexistent 
or, at least, perceived as unworthy of notice by biographers. 
Of course, Coke was not ignorant of the 1606 Virginia charter. 
He seems most likely to have looked it over; he may have even made 
alterations. But there is no evidence that he drafted the letters patent 
 
 62. HUGHES, supra note 60, at 80. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., THOMAS G. BARNES, SHAPING THE COMMON LAW: FROM GLANVILL 
TO HALE, 1188–1688, at xxxiii–lxxiii (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2008) (no mention of settlement 
activities in chapter on Coke); ALAN CROMARTIE, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST 
REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1450–1642, at 179–233 (2006) 
(no mention of settlement activities in chapter on Coke); LAW, LIBERTY, AND 
PARLIAMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 387–406 
(Allen D. Boyer ed., 2004) (no apparent mention of settlement activities in the index); 1 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD COKE, supra note 54, at xxxiii (no mention in 
chronology of events other than 1621 recommendation of Roger Williams, to be scholar at 
Sutton Hospital); DAVID CHAN SMITH, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF 
THE LAWS: RELIGION, POLITICS AND JURISPRUDENCE, 1578–1616, at 91 n.2 (J.H. Baker 
ed., 2014) (discussing Popham’s involvement in the settlements, but not Coke’s); 
Hulsebosch, supra note 24, at 444 (arguing that Calvin’s Case helped to underpin the 
legalities of English settlement but not discussing direct involvement). 
 65. The Second Virginia Charter (1609), reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 3790, 3790–95 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 7 FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (listing a Sir William Cooke and Captain John Cooke). 
 66. See DOUGLAS WALTHEW RICE, THE LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF SIR JOHN 
POPHAM, 1531–1607, at 3, 7 (2005); SMITH, supra note 64, at 91–114 (describing Popham’s 
participation in the Fens draining project and Coke’s concerns). 
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from scratch or made major substantive changes. There is no evidence 
to attribute to Coke the linguistic differences in the liberties 
assurance between the 1606 Virginia document and the earlier letters 
patent. Thus Coke seems unlikely to have been the framer depicted in 
the conventional account. 
Of equal importance, the language of the 1606 Virginia charter 
was not unique in extending liberties. The judicious use of ellipses 
renders the charter phrase in particularly appealing modern terms: 
“[persons shall] have and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, and 
Immunities	.	.	.	to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding 
and born, within this our Realm of England.”67 The genealogy and 
later influence of the language, however, suggests interpretive 
caution. As will be described later in this Article, the liberties 
assurance originated in earlier Elizabethan letters patent, and before 
that, even older denization letters, patents, and statutes addressing 
the status of overseas children.68 The 1606 charter misleadingly 
appears to be new because the previous letters patent referred to the 
“privileges of free denizens.”69 The 1606 charter omitted the “free 
denizen” phrase,70 but the omission is a red herring. The 1606 Virginia 
charter’s omission was not influential, and the “free denizen” phrase 
reappeared in the second Virginia charter in 1609, the 1610 
Newfoundland charter, the 1615 Bermuda charter, and the 1620 New 
England charter.71 To the extent that a Virginia charter was 
influential on other charters, it was the 1609 charter (including this 
free denizen phrase borrowed from earlier charters) that was 
precisely copied for other charters.72 Moreover, recent scholars such 
as Tomlins and MacMillan pay little heed to the semantic differences 
among the language of the early charters.73 The 1606 Virginia 
charter’s appealing language has been overinterpreted. 
 
 67. See Price, supra note 46, at 74. 
 68. See infra Section III.B. 
 69. See, e.g., Charter to Sir Walter Raleigh (1584) (spelling modernized), reprinted in 
1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 53, 55 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) 
[hereinafter 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
 70. The First Charter of Virginia (1606), reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 65, at 3783, 3788. 
 71. See infra text accompanying notes 291–94. 
 72. Compare infra note 294, with infra notes 295–305. 
 73. See MACMILLAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND POSSESSION, supra note 58, at 92 
(providing a general description); TOMLINS, supra note 21, at 82 n.59, 157–58 n.80 (noting 
that “[t]his was established from the outset”). 
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Interestingly, the 1606 Virginia charter’s language was likely 
forgotten until the 1740s. One cannot find a contemporaneous 
popular printing of the 1606 charter. The Virginia Company 
published nine documents between 1609 and 1615—but they did not 
print the 1606 charter.74 Afterwards in 1623, the original records of 
the Company were confiscated.75 In 1625, when Samuel Purchas 
printed the Virginia charter, he used only the very first sections and 
did not include the liberties assurance.76 He emphasized that specifics 
were “too long to reherse, seeing this Patent hath beene often altered 
and renewed.”77 
The apparent importance of the 1606 charter dates from its 
rediscovery in the eighteenth century. A manuscript containing 
company records in the library of the Earl of Southampton was sold 
to William Byrd of Virginia.78 The manuscript was copied by William 
Stith and published in History of the First Discovery and Settlement of 
Virginia.79 Thomas Jefferson later acquired the manuscript, referred 
to as the Bland copy (it resides today at the Library of Congress).80 
Due to Stith’s rediscovery of the manuscript, the 1606 charter began 
to appear in eighteenth-century political debates.81 
 
 74. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON, supra note 58, at 32. 
 75. Id. at 107–15 (“The danger of confiscation of the company’s records [occurred] on 
May 22, 1623, when the Privy Council enforced a previous [confiscation] order	.	.	.	.”); see 
also id. at 18 (referring to nineteenth-century reprints of charter). The original charter is 
not extant. There is a microfilm copy at The National Archives, United Kingdom, Patent 
Roll, 4 James 1 PRO/TNA C66/1709. There is also “an early, but damaged copy,” in The 
Plymouth City Archives, United Kingdom, W.360/57. See 1 THE JAMESTOWN VOYAGES 
UNDER THE FIRST CHARTER 1606–1609, at 24 n.1 (Philip Barbour ed., 1969). 
 76. 18 SAMUEL PURCHAS, PURCHAS HIS PILGRIMES 399, 403 (Glasgow Univ. Press 
1906) (1625) (including that each of the two colonies have “libertie to carrie all Subjects 
(not restrained) which will goe with them”). 
 77. Id. at 403. 
 78. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON, supra note 58, at 
42–44, 47. Thomas Jefferson believed they were “copied from the originals, under the eye, 
if I recollect rightly, of the Earl of Southampton, a member of the company.” Id. at 43 
(citing NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 19, 1825). 
 79. See id. at 43–44; EDWARD D. NEILL, HISTORY OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF 
LONDON ch. iv (1869); see also WILLIAM STITH, THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST DISCOVERY 
AND SETTLEMENT OF VIRGINIA 35–36, app. 1 (photo. reprint 1965) (1747). 
 80. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON, supra note 58, at 42. 
 81. See, e.g., JAMES ABERCROMBY, DE JURE ET GUBERNATIONE COLONIARUM, 
reprinted in MAGNA CHARTA FOR AMERICA 172–73, 212 (Jack P. Greene et al. eds., 
1986) (“And, on the part of the Crown it is stipulated, and declared by Charters, that the 
Inhabitants of the Colonys shall be held and deemed, as free Denizens and Lieges of the 
Kingdom of England, with all the Rights, Privileges, and Immunitys, incident to Natural 
born Subjects, as if they had been Born and Abiding, within the Realm of England, words 
very significant.”); THE CHARTERS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 67 (John 
Almon ed., 1774). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1545 (2016) 
2016] CHARTER CONSTITUTIONALISM 1563 
Lastly, the assumption that Coke’s opinion in Calvin’s Case 
accurately reflected categorical distinctions among denizens, aliens, 
and others may not reflect the broader legal understanding. Coke was 
only one of numerous judges and lawyers who expressed opinions on 
the legal issues relating to the status of the Scots.82 Indeed, Ellesmere 
made the unusual decision to publish his speech in the Exchequer 
chamber, emphasizing that the twelve judges had “concurred in 
judgment, but upon several reasons.”83 The judges themselves 
distinguished Calvin’s Case from the situation of “persons born 
beyond seas.”84 In arguing over the issue, Francis Bacon suggested no 
dispute over the status of overseas children: “[A]ll children born in 
any parts of the world, if they be of English parents continuing at that 
time as liege subjects to the king, and having done no act to forfeit the 
benefit of their allegiance, are ipso facto naturalized.”85 
Like Bacon’s comments, Ellesmere’s own conclusion was 
expansive: “[A]ll, that have been born in any of the king’s dominions 
since he was king of England, are capable and inheritable in all his 
dominions without exception.”86 Coke’s opinion may have overstated 
the distinctions between terms such as “denizen” and “subject.” 
Indeed, Bacon explained that the word denizen, was 
“sometimes	.	.	.	confounded with a natural born subject.”87 
Intriguingly, Ellesmere’s published speech cautioned readers about 
the veracity of claimed legal distinctions, noting, “a man may wander 
 
 82. 2 CORBET’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 562, 568–69 (1809) 
[hereinafter 2 STATE TRIALS] (describing Popham, Flemming, and Coke’s opinions); id. at 
576 (describing the Walmesly dissent and other justices’ agreement); id. at 669 
(emphasizing Popham’s opinion). 
 83. Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s Speech in the Exchequer Chamber, in the Case of 
the Postnati (1608) [hereinafter Chancellor Ellesmere’s Speech], in 2 STATE TRIALS, supra 
note 82, at 659, 668 (spelling modernized); see LOUIS A. KNAFLA, LAW AND POLITICS IN 
JACOBEAN ENGLAND: THE TRACTS OF LORD CHANCELLOR ELLESMERE 184, 207 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1977). 
 84. Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377; 7 Co. Rep. 1 b, 
reprinted in 2 STATE TRIALS, supra note 82, at 572. 
 85. Speech of Lord Bacon as Counsel for Calvin, in the Exchequer Chamber, in the 
Case of the Postnati (1608) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Speech of Lord Bacon], in 2 
STATE TRIALS, supra note 82, at 595, 601; see Harvey Wheeler, The Semiotics of 
“Constitution” in England and America, SIRBACON.ORG, http://www.sirbacon.org
/wheelerconstitution.htm [perma.cc/XP4Y-QG3A] (arguing for Bacon’s brief in Calvin’s 
Case as “the institutional genome” of constitutionalism in England and America). 
 86. Chancellor Ellesmere’s Speech, supra note 83, at 695 (spelling modernized); see 
MACMILLAN, ATLANTIC IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 49, at 17 (suggesting that 
reciprocal sovereignty depended on allegiance). 
 87. Speech of Lord Bacon, supra note 85, at 576, 582; see Francis Bacon, 7 THE 
WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 639, 648 (Spedding et al. eds., 1879). 
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and miss his way in mists of distinction.”88 Despite the lengthy erudite 
reasoning, Coke’s opinion may not have had the extensive relevance 
to the status of overseas children that has been assumed. As Jacob 
Selwood remarks on the case, “[w]hen viewed through the lens of 
practice, the sheer irrelevance of the 1608 ruling is striking	.	.	.	.”89 In 
sum, the 1606 Virginia Charter may have had little to do with Coke’s 
opinion two years later in Calvin’s Case. 
If the liberties assurance did not arise because Coke inserted it 
into the Virginia charter, then what explains its appearance and 
persistence? By rotating our view away from the allure of Coke and 
Calvin’s Case, we can glimpse a new explanation. The liberties 
assurance drew on the experience and aspiration of a larger 
community. For this community, overseas children were a reality and 
the liberties assurance symbolized faith in the breadth of English legal 
protection. 
III.  ADVENTURERS IN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The liberties assurance arose from a community. It was not the 
product of a single mind or single moment. The men behind the early 
English efforts to expand trade and geographic boundaries were also 
legal adventurers. And the legal mechanics of English settlement 
drew on English law. Concepts were adopted and, over time, details 
defined in response to new difficulties both real and theoretical. In 
the process, this community began to create an early type of written 
constitutionalism.  
A. Collective Creation 
In contrast to legal scholarship’s focus on Edward Coke, 
historical scholarship on the early settlements emphasized collective 
contributions. There were multiple overlapping groups of family, 
professional, and business relationships. This web in turn supported a 
cultural space in which a new understanding of constitutionalism 
could flourish. 
 
 88. Chancellor Ellesmere’s Speech, supra note 83, at 679, 695–96 (spelling 
modernized). Ellesmere concluded that the postnati are “in reason, and by the common 
lawe of England, naturall-borne subjects within the allegeance of the king of England” 
permitted to purchase, inherit, use, and sue for real property in England. Id. at 696. He 
emphasized the many acceptable ways in which judges had read language to be completely 
construed in opposition to its apparent sense. Id. at 675–76. He noted that it “must be” 
because “otherwise much mischiefe and great inconvenience will ensue.” Id. at 675–76. 
 89. JACOB SELWOOD, DIVERSITY AND DIFFERENCE IN EARLY MODERN LONDON 
99 (2010). 
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The first two letters patent for settlement came from the family 
of Katherine Champernowne. Champernowne’s first husband was 
Otho Gilbert.90 Her aunt was Queen Elizabeth’s governess, Kat 
(Champernowne) Astley.91 Her three sons were John, Humphrey, and 
Adrian Gilbert.92 After Otho Gilbert died, Champernowne married 
Walter Raleigh (senior).93 By her second marriage, Champernowne 
had two additional sons, Walter and Carew Raleigh.94 The half-
brothers were closely linked to the first two letters patent from 
Elizabeth. Humphrey Gilbert received the first letters patent for a 
settlement, and served as “a key node in a thickly connected network 
of men associated with each other and with each other’s projects.”95 
After Humphrey Gilbert disappeared and presumably died in a 
storm, his brother Walter Raleigh acquired a similar letters patent.96 
Adrian Gilbert and Carew Raleigh were also both involved with early 
colonization efforts. As Mary Fuller explains, a “linked succession of 
patent holders” from Gilbert to Raleigh to the Virginia Company 
created “an emerging community focused on schemes of colonization 
and exploration.”97 
The Middle Temple provided another group of connections.98 
Walter Raleigh and Adrian Gilbert were both members.99 Richard 
Hakluyt (the “lawyer”) and his younger cousin of the same name, 
Richard Hakluyt, were members.100 The older Hakluyt authored 
several memoranda on early settlement ventures; the younger 
 
 90. ROSEMARY O’DAY, THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE TUDOR AGE 174–75 
(2010) (entry on Humphrey Gilbert). 
 91. Brendan Wolfe, Sir Walter Raleigh (ca. 1552–1618), ENCYCLOPEDIA VA., 
http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Raleigh_Sir_Walter_ca_1552-1618#start_entry 
[http://perma.cc/46T2-5FRQ] (“[Champernowne’s] aunt Katherine ‘Kat’ Astley	.	.	.	served as 
governess and confidant to the future Queen Elizabeth.”). 
 92. RICE, supra note 66, at 37. 
 93. DAVID BEERS QUINN, SET FAIR FOR ROANOKE: VOYAGES AND COLONIES, 
1584–1606, at 3–4 (1985). 
 94. Id.; CHARLES WESLEY TUTTLE, CAPT. FRANCIS CHAMPERNOWNE: THE DUTCH 
CONQUEST OF ACADIE 70 n.3 (Albert Harrison Hoyt ed., 1889). 
 95. MARY C. FULLER, VOYAGES IN PRINT: ENGLISH TRAVEL TO AMERICA, 1576–
1624, at 17 (1995). 
 96. Id. at 38 (“Gilbert’s death was followed by a proliferation of plans and projects: 
most notable of these, Walter Raleigh’s sponsorship first of explorations and then of a 
colony on the Outer Banks of North Carolina under a new patent, based on the wording 
of Gilbert’s but omitting rights to Newfoundland.” (spelling modernized)). 
 97. Id. at 17. 
 98. See Richard Hill, The Maritime Connection in the Middle Temple, in HISTORY OF 
THE MIDDLE TEMPLE 111, 111–45 (Richard O. Havery ed., 2011); see also John Colyer, 
The American Connection, in HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, supra, at 239–42. 
 99. Hill, supra note 98, at 114–15. 
 100. Id. at 114; QUINN, supra note 93, at 4. 
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published the Gilbert and Raleigh charters in his influential The 
Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffics, and Discoveries of the 
English Nation.101 Ralph Lane was the 1585 Governor of Virginia 
under the Raleigh patent and is thought to have been a member of 
the Middle Temple.102 Another member, Bartholomew Gosnold, 
undertook a successful voyage to Cape Cod in 1602 under the Raleigh 
patent.103 Edwin Sandys, a leader in the 1606 Virginia settlement and 
possibly drafter of the 1609 second charter, and George Sandys, later 
Treasurer of the Virginia Company, were members.104 George Percy, 
who would go on to write about the early years of the Virginia 
settlement and would become deputy governor in 1609, was a 
member.105 Indeed, the role of the Middle Temple in creating the 
legal architecture for English settlement may stretch even farther 
back. John Rastell, whose interpretation of common law and statutes 
underpinned the transfer of English liberties and attempted to 
organize an early venture, was a barrister at Middle Temple.106 As 
Finbarr McCarthy emphasizes, the 1606 Virginia venture had the 
“pervasive influence of men with legal knowledge and experience.”107 
Business connections created by the various trading and 
settlement companies formed an even larger network. Stretching 
backwards in time, the Merchant Adventurers Company provided a 
model for the early efforts. The Company of Merchant Adventurers 
of London and its younger sibling, the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers of Bristol, were dominant in the sixteenth century.108 As 
editor Susan Kingsbury notes, the Virginia Company records 
“correspond so closely in form and in subject-matter” to that of the 
Merchant Adventurers Company and the East India Company “that 
the similarity in form of organization and methods of conducting 
business is established.”109 “[M]any of the members of the Virginia 
Company” had participated in earlier exploration efforts and were 
 
 101. See 1 THE PRINCIPAL NAVIGATIONS, VOYAGES, TRAFFICS AND DISCOVERIES 
OF THE ENGLISH NATION 195, 207–17 (Edmund Goldsmid ed., 1885) (1589). 
 102. Hill, supra note 98, at 118–19. 
 103. Id. at 124. 
 104. Id. at 132. 
 105. Id. at 133. 
 106. Rastell was also the brother-in-law of Thomas More. Cecil H. Clough, Rastell, 
John	(c.1475–1536),	OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb
.com/view/article/23149 [http://perma.cc/7Y9Y-3WGV]. 
 107. McCarthy, supra note 56, at 339. 
 108. See Anne F. Sutton, The Merchant Adventurers of England: Their Origins and the 
Mercers’ Company of London, 75 HIST. RES. 25, 25–26, 45 (2002). 
 109. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON, supra note 58, at 14–
15. 
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stockholders or officers in the Merchant Adventurers and other 
companies.110 
The 1606 Virginia charter integrated these various groups with 
one man at the center, John Popham.111 The eight patentees included 
Richard Hakluyt (the younger); Raleigh Gilbert (son of Humphrey 
Gilbert and nephew of Walter Raleigh), George Popham (nephew to 
Popham), and Thoman Hannam (grandson of Popham).112 John 
Popham was a member of Middle Temple.113 Beginning in 1569, he 
was involved with the Munster plantation, an effort to settle English 
subjects in Ireland.114 He became solicitor general in 1579, just after 
Gilbert’s patent.115 In 1581, while serving as attorney general, he 
reviewed the Raleigh patent. His extant copy of the Raleigh patent 
reveals close attention to detail with small technical changes noted.116 
From 1592 to 1607, Popham was the Chief Justice of Queen’s 
Bench, and during that time participated directly in the effort to 
acquire the 1606 charter and found the Virginia settlement.117 
Historian David Quinn repeats a description in which Popham, then 
Lord Chief Justice, took “sort of ‘great pains’ about the plantation of 
a colony in Virginia, and declared himself ready to call all interested 
parties before him and ‘by their advices set down the best manner of 
project.’	”118 Quinn suggested that “Sir John himself may have taken 
the lead” in drafting the 1606 charter.119 Finnbar McCarthy similarly 
suggests that Popham “probably drafted the version” that was sent 
with the petition and “any revisions.”120 
 
 110. Id. at 14. 
 111. See McCarthy, supra note 56, at 340–42. 
 112. ANDREWS, supra note 56, at 80–82. 
 113. RICE, supra note 66, at 21. 
 114. See MICHAEL MACCARTHY MORROGH, THE MUNSTER PLANTATION: ENGLISH 
MIGRATION TO SOUTHERN IRELAND, 1583–1641, at 41–45 (1986) (noting that it appears 
solicitor general Thomas Egerton, later Lord Ellesmere, drafted the “commissions, 
articles, and subsequent letters patent” in consultation with attorney general Popham). 
 115. RICE, supra note 66, at app. 2. 
 116. Sir Walter Raleigh, Discovery of the Heathen Lands (1851–1853) (on file with 
The National Archives, United Kingdom, 30/34/1). Thanks to Robert Palmer for help with 
copies and Frank Herrmann for deciphering Popham’s handwriting. 
 117. See HENRY S. BURRAGE, THE BEGINNINGS OF COLONIAL MAINE, 1602–1658, at 
38 (1914) (“Probably, also, Sir John Popham, then Chief Justice of England, had a part in 
the new undertaking.”). 
 118. 1 THE JAMESTOWN VOYAGES UNDER THE FIRST CHARTER 1606–1609, supra 
note 75, at 14 (quoting Cecil Papers: March 1606, in 18 CALENDAR OF THE CECIL PAPERS 
IN HATFIELD HOUSE 69, 84 (M. S. Giuseppi ed., 1940), http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/cal-cecil-papers/vol18/pp69-92 [http://perma.cc/FD7P-7GGM]). 
 119. Id. (noting precedents from the Muscovy and East India Company and 
mentioning Sir Robert Cecil “and possibly Sir Edward Coke	.	.	.	and John Dodderidge”). 
 120. McCarthy, supra note 56, at 342. 
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Ultimately, however, Popham’s legacy would not be with the 
southern efforts to settle at Jamestown but instead with northern 
efforts to settle on the Kennebec River (now Maine).121 In May 1607, 
George Popham, likely John Popham’s nephew, led a group that built 
Fort St. George.122 In late 1608, the entire group of colonists returned 
to England.123 But Popham died in June 1607, never learning of the 
temporary success of the settlement.124 
By 1609, the community interested in the settlements spread 
deep into English law and politics.125 The 1609 Virginia charter listed 
659 persons and fifty-six corporate entities as subscribers.126 As one 
editor notes, “[f]ifty of the incorporators were members of the 
existing parliament, and fifty more were members of Parliament at 
one time or another.”127 Lord Cecil, Francis Bacon, Calvert (the 
future Lord Baltimore), Sandys, and Hakluyt were all members.128 In 
1621 when Sandys proposed changes for a new charter, he described 
the “infinity of names by reason of the multitude of Adventurers 
(increasing still more and more, as for that many were already named 
in a former Patent).”129 Accordingly, the third charter abandoned 
individual names and referred collectively to the “Adventurers and 
Planters in Virginia.”130 
As this account establishes, in contrast to the depiction of Coke 
as an individual drafter of the language of the Virginia charter, the 
Virginia charter arose from the efforts of a large community. In fact, 
if one individual were to be named as bearing particular 
responsibility, it would likely be John Popham. But regardless, the 
conceptual underpinnings of the liberties assurance reflected this 
intertwined community. 
 
 121. See RICE, supra note 66, at 241, 245, 270. 
 122. See BURRAGE, supra note 117, at 76 n.2. 
 123. See RICE, supra note 66, at 256–57; see also BURRAGE, supra note 117, at 50–51, 
54–56, 58–59, 63–99 (detailing the early efforts to colonize modern-day New England). 
 124. See RICE, supra note 66, at 261. 
 125. 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 65, at 3790–95. 
 126. Id.; The Third Charter of the Virginia Company (Mar. 12, 1612), reprinted in 5 
NEW AMERICAN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA TO 1612, at 
226, 226 (David B. Quinn ed., 1979) [hereinafter 5 NEW AMERICAN WORLD]. 
 127. WILLIS MASON WEST, A SOURCE BOOK IN AMERICAN HISTORY TO 1787, at 38 
n.1 (1913). 
 128. See id. 
 129. NEILL, supra note 79, at 24 (quoting Manuscript Transcript of the Virginia 
Company (Feb. 22, 1620)) (spelling modernized). 
 130. Id. at 25 (spelling modernized). 
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B. The Status of Overseas Children 
The liberties assurance drew on the experience of the 
adventuring community. The central concern of the clause was to 
ensure that children born overseas would have the same legal status 
of those born in England. That concept can be traced back through 
the privileges clause of the Gilbert and Raleigh patents to the private 
statutes and letters patent used to confirm the privileges of children 
born to English merchants overseas. The language used in the early 
charters comes from these sources. Interestingly, the legal status of 
children born overseas to English subjects under license does not 
appear to have been controversial. 
Coke’s 1608 opinion in Calvin’s Case obscured the prior legal 
landscape regarding overseas children.131 The opinion was interpreted 
by William Holdsworth as a “restatement of the law” instead of a new 
conceptualization of various precedents and sources.132 Coke so 
persuasively described the past through his distinctions that it became 
nearly impossible to understand it in other ways. Cambridge law 
professor, Clive Parry, however, rejected the claim that Calvin’s Case 
did “no more than to restate the law.”133 To Parry, the statutes and 
cases before 1608 “present so confused a picture that it is often 
impossible to say what they imply.”134 Other scholars cast similar 
doubt on the validity of Coke’s description of rigid rules and clear 
dichotomies.135 In particular, scholars have disagreed over whether 
there was a rigid distinction between naturalization (allegedly 
requiring an act of Parliament) and denization (allegedly a “limited 
sort of citizenship” that could be obtained by letters patent).136 Parry 
 
 131. See, e.g., Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608), 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 380–
82; 7 Co. Rep. 1 b, 2 b–4 b. 
 132. 9 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 74–79 (1926). For example, 
Holdsworth cites distinctions from Coke on Littleton as authority for fourteenth-century 
law. Id. at 77. 
 133. CLIVE PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 39 (1957). 
 134. Id. 
 135. J. M. Ross, English Nationality Law: Soli or Sanguinis?, in GROTIAN SOCIETY 
PAPERS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 1, 3–4 (Charles Henry 
Alexandrowicz ed., 1972) (“[I]t was not until the seventeenth century	.	.	.	that it became 
established that mere birth in England made a person a subject of the king, and even then 
the rule was not quite absolute.	.	.	.	[F]rom at least the fourteenth century the jus sanguinis 
was applied to a considerable extent to the children of English parents born in foreign 
parts	.	.	.	.”). 
 136. LAURA HUNT YUNGBLUT, STRANGERS SETTLED HERE AMONGST US: 
POLICIES, PERCEPTIONS AND THE PRESENCE OF ALIENS IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 78 
(1996) (summarizing the conventional distinction); see id. at 78 n.59 (describing the debate 
and siding with Holdsworth). Yungblut does not address Clive Parry’s work. See id. at 166 
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is more cautious about the “state of the law before Calvin’s Case.”137 
Leaving aside Coke’s categories allows us to see a legal framework 
with considerable ambiguity. 
By the mid-fourteenth century, certain children born overseas 
were extended the same status as those born in England. In 1350, the 
statute De natis ultra mare (“of births beyond the seas”) was passed to 
ensure that children born abroad would be extended the most 
important legal right—the right to inherit real property.138 The statute 
permitted such children to sue for inheritances despite potential 
allegations of an absence of proof of their legitimacy.139 According to 
the statute: 
all Children Inheritors, which from henceforth shall be born 
without the Ligeance of the King, whose Fathers and Mothers 
at the Time of their Birth be and shall be at the Faith and 
Ligeance of the King of England, shall have and enjoy the same 
Benefits and Advantages, to have and bear the 
Inheritance	.	.	.	as the other Inheritors.140 
The foundational rationale involved ligeance—a word that 
eventually became the more common word, “allegiance.”141 As 
historian Keechang Kim explained, the “ambiguity of the word 
ligeance allowed new ideas to be discussed in old terminology.”142 
Ligeance removed overseas children from legal disabilities that would 
later be characterized as those connected to alien status. The initial 
 
(not mentioning Parry’s work in the bibliography). On balance, Parry, Kim, and the 
archival evidence presented in the old William Shaw volume plausibly complicate 
Holdsworth’s interpretation. See generally LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS OF 
NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, 1603–1700 [hereinafter 
LETTERS OF DENIZATION] (showing enactments bearing a distinction between 
naturalized citizens and denizens), reprinted in 18 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE 
HUGUENOT SOCIETY OF LONDON 2 (William A. Shaw ed., 1911). Holdsworth notably 
cites Coke throughout the section describing the “development of the law down to 
Calvin’s Case.” HOLDSWORTH, supra note 132, 74, 76–77 (following the same lines as 
Coke’s opinion in Calvin’s Case). 
 137. PARRY, supra note 133, at 39. See infra text accompanying notes 156–64. 
 138. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350–1351, 25 Edw. 3 
c.1 (Eng.). For debate as to whether the law was declaratory of the common law or 
prospective, see ALEXANDER COCKBURN, NATIONALITY, OR THE LAW RELATING TO 
SUBJECTS AND ALIENS 8–9 (1869). 
 139. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350–1351, 25 Edw. 3 
c.1 (Eng.). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See KEECHANG KIM, ALIENS IN MEDIEVAL LAW: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN 
CITIZENSHIP 178 n.5 (2000) (stating that “allegiance” became the preferred spelling 
during or after the reign of Elizabeth I). 
 142. Id. at 150; see also id. at 113–25 (arguing that the background rule was concerned 
with legitimacy rather than nationality). 
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statute bearing this term was reprinted in later statute compilations.143 
In the sixteenth century, it became part of discussions over the 
legitimacy of the claims of Mary Stuart and Margaret Lenox to the 
English throne.144 The statute implied that children born overseas 
could have their rights secured by the allegiance of their parents and 
thus be assured the same status as those born in England. 
In 1368, a second statute addressed the status of children born 
overseas.145 Once again, status defined by birth in England was 
established as the standard. The 1368 statute emphasized the 
necessity of a connection to the crown, this time by focusing on the 
place. The statute provided that children born in parts of France 
within lands “that pertain to” the king would inherit as if they had 
been “born within the Realm of England.”146 Although ligeance was 
not explicitly stated, the underlying rationale seemed similar.147 Those 
born in lands in crown allegiance had the same inheritance rights as 
those in England. By the end of the fourteenth century, the two 
statutes described a legal concept of rights, defined by birth in 
England, and extended to those who by place or by parentage could 
claim crown allegiance. 
In the early sixteenth century, the lawyer John Rastell promoted 
overseas settlement and the assurance of “as if born in England” 
status. In 1517, Rastell obtained a letters patent from Henry VIII 
granting permission to travel overseas.148 Historian David Beers 
Quinn considers Rastell the “first Englishman” to try “to bring out a 
colony to North America.”149 Rastell, however, was forced to end the 
voyage in Ireland.150 Nonetheless, after his return, his legal 
publications provided assurance that the issue of English parents born 
overseas would not be outside of English legal protections. In 1525, 
 
 143. Id. at 153–55. 
 144. Id. at 159–75. 
 145. A Statute Made at Westminster on the First Day of May, in the Forty-Second 
Year of King Edward III 1368, 42 Edw. 3 c.10 (Eng.) (“[I]nfants born beyond the sea, 
within the seignories of Calais, and elsewhere, within the lands and seignories that pertain 
to our lord the King beyond the sea, be as able and inheritable of their heritage in 
England, as other infants born within the realm of England	.	.	.	.”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See KIM, supra note 141, at 142–43; Ross, supra note 135, at 6. 
 148. Patent from Henry VIII Granting Protection to John Rastell and Others (March 
5, 1517), reprinted in 1 NEW AMERICAN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NORTH 
AMERICA TO 1612, at 161, 161–62 (David B. Quinn ed., 1979) [hereinafter 1 NEW 
AMERICAN WORLD]. 
 149. Id. at 161. 
 150. Id.; see also Interlude of the Four Elements (1517–1519), reprinted in 1 NEW 
AMERICAN WORLD, supra note 148, at 168, 168. 
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Rastell published an influential book on the terms of law.151 Under 
the term, “alyon” (alien), Rastell explained that English men 
overseas, under Crown license, were not aliens.152 By the 1579 edition 
(printed in English), Rastell declared, “if an English man go over the 
seas with the Queen’s license, and there have issue this issue is no 
alien.”153 This strong statement continued to occur, even in the 1607 
edition just before Calvin’s Case.154 In 1527, Rastell published an 
updated version of his statutory abridgment; he translated de natis 
ultra mare into English and placed it under the heading of 
“Englisshemen.”155 The Rastell publications offered reassurance that 
those born overseas would be treated as if born in England. 
A case from 1483 seemingly confirmed that the overseas issue of 
English parents could inherit as if born in England.156 The case 
contained the sentence: “[H]e who is born overseas, and his father 
and mother were English, their issue inherit by the common law, but 
the statute makes clear.”157 In the 1576 La Graunde Abridgement, the 
case appeared under the heading “Denizen & alien.”158 
Statutes during the sixteenth century also addressed the status of 
overseas children. Thus, between 1541 and 1542, statutes made 
specific overseas children “free” and “in the nature of mere 
 
 151. JOHN RASTELL, EXPOSICIONES	T[ER]MINO[RUM]	LEGU[M]	ANGLO[RUM] [AN 
EXPOSITION OF ENGLISH LEGAL TERMS]	(1525), http://eebo.chadwyck.com/search/full
_rec?source=pgimages.cfg&action=byid&id=99837930&file=&searchscreen=param
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there hath issue, this issue is no alien.”). 
 155. JOHN RASTELL, THE STATUTES PROHEMIUM IOANNIS RASTELL [AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STATUTES BY JOHN RASTELL], at lxix (1527) (“And all children 
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 156. Mich. 1 Ric. 3, pl. 7, fol. 4a (King's Bench 1483), http://www.bu.edu
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reference number “Seipp 1483.039”). 
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Englishmen.”159 In each statutorily specified instance, an Englishman 
(usually a merchant or in the king’s service) had married and had a 
child with a non-English woman. The statutes declared the children to 
be the king’s “Naturall Subjects” and as “lawfull p[er]sons borne” 
within England.160 They were given the rights to sue, to inherit, and all 
other rights as if “naturally borne” within England.161 
Further, throughout the sixteenth century, individual children 
born overseas had their status affirmed by parliamentary statute or 
letters patent. The reasons were varied. Some instances involved the 
children of English parents who had fled during the reign of Mary.162 
Other cases seem to relate to uncertainty regarding the effect of 
marriage to a particular woman for reasons of her origin or religion.163 
In some cases, it may have been the desire for absolute certainty or 
even unnecessary certainty. Clive Parry suggested that some parents 
took such steps even where none were legally required.164 
Members of the Merchant Adventurers were particularly 
concerned about the status of overseas children. In 1576, various 
merchants obtained a parliamentary act naturalizing their children: 
“for the manumising of the children of diverse English men borne 
beyond the seas.”165 In 1581, another “bill concerning straungers’ 
 
 159. An Act for Making Free Certain Children Born, Beyond the Sea, and to Put the 
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merchandising.’	” Id. at 175–76. Both cases involved Eastland merchants. See id. 
 164. PARRY, supra note 133, at 40 (“There is a suggestion that in many cases these 
[private acts of naturalization] are strictly unnecessary.”). 
 165. 1 PROCEEDINGS IN THE PARLIAMENTS OF ELIZABETH I, at 482 (T.E. Hartley ed., 
1981) (listing the date of the act as February 21, 1576). At the same time a bill for 
“naturalizing” the children of James Harvye (Harvy) and others was read. Id. at 483–84. 
Merchants appear repeatedly. For example, in 1576, the sons of Richard Molde, officer of 
the Merchant Adventurers in England, and Margaret Peppercorne of Antwerp were given 
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children and denizens” passed after various changes.166 Whether or 
not necessary, parents wanted to ensure that overseas children 
suffered no legal disabilities. 
In this period before Calvin’s Case, a variety of words were used 
to describe the status of as if born in England. Parry explained that, 
during the Elizabethan reign, “private acts of 
naturalization	.	.	.	provide quite indifferently for the ‘naturalizing’ or 
for the ‘making a free denizen’ of the beneficiary.”167 The “distinction 
was at all times imprecise.”168 During Queen Elizabeth’s reign, 
Parliament passed bills making “free denizens” of people born 
beyond the seas—outside of England during the reign of Queen 
Mary. For example, in 1566, a parliamentary bill made “free Denizen 
John Stafforde born beyond the Seas.”169 Stafford had been born in 
Geneva after his family “went into exile on the accession of Queen 
Mary.”170 In 1571, another parliamentary act used the phrase “to 
make free Denizen Peregrine Bertie borne beyond the Seas.”171 The 
term “free denizen” was used by Parliament to signal what would 
later become naturalization by statute. As Parry concludes, “the 
 
letters of denization. See LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS OF NATURALIZATION FOR 
ALIENS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, 1509–1603, at 172 (listing the children of Richard 
Molde among the list of those who received denization letters). 
 166. 1 PROCEEDINGS IN THE PARLIAMENTS OF ELIZABETH I, supra note 165, at 537 
(listing the date of the act as February 16, 1581). In March 1581 another bill “for 
denization of certaine persons” passed. Id. at 541. 
 167. PARRY, supra note 133, at 39. 
 168. PARRY, supra note 133, at 38; see LETTERS OF DENIZATION, supra note 136, at 
vi–vii. The contrary interpretation comes from Holdsworth. He interpreted Coke’s 
opinion in Calvin’s Case as an accurate description of prior existing distinctions between 
natural subject (created only by Parliamentary naturalization and possessing all liberties) 
and free denizen (created only by crown endenization through letters patent and 
possessing more limited liberties). HOLDSWORTH, supra note 132, at 76–79. According to 
this approach, endenization was prospective so that the denizen could not inherit and a 
child born to the denizen prior to the parent’s denization could not inherit. See 
YUNGBLUT, supra note 136, at 78. Naturalization was thought to be a matter of 
parliamentary act and acted retrospectively so as to permit a naturalized subject to inherit. 
See LETTERS OF DENIZATION, supra note 136, at iii (“The question as to the remainder 
who were not so born was remitted to the succeeding parliament for maturer 
consideration.”). 
 169. An Act to Make Free Denizen John Stafforde Born Beyond the Seas, 8 Eliz. 1 
(Eng.) (1819) (spelling modernized), reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM, at xxviii, 
xxviii; LETTERS OF DENIZATION, supra note 136, at 224 (spelling modernized). 
 170. Will of John Stafford, of Marlwood, Esq., supra note 162, at 142. 
 171. An Act to Make Free Denizen Peregrine Bertie Born Beyond the Seas, 13 Eliz. 1 
(Eng.) (spelling modernized), reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM, at xxx, xxx (1810); 
see also RETURNS OF ALIENS DWELLING IN THE CITY AND SUBURBS OF LONDON 388, 
445 (R. E. G. Kirk & Ernest F. Kirk eds., 1907) (showing the phrase “free denyzen” used 
in 1568 and the phrase “free denizen” used in 1593). 
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choice between enactment and letters patent is dictated solely by 
chance and convenience.”172 
Elizabethan letters patent of denization used language that 
resemble the language eventually used in the liberties assurance. The 
linguistic trope of treating children born overseas as those born within 
England appeared in the 1368 statute.173 By the early sixteenth 
century, typical language in letters patent of denization declared the 
person to “have and possess all and all manner of liberties, franchises, 
and privileges of this our realm of England freely, quietly, and 
peacefully, and may use and enjoy them as our liege born within our 
said realm of England	.	.	.	.”174 The Elizabethan letters patent were 
similar.175 The formula to provide reassurance that overseas children 
would have the same liberties, franchises, and privileges as those born 
in England was thus framed long before English settlement. 
During the Elizabethan years, the significant concern for 
overseas children turned on the presence or absence of Crown 
license, not the later subject-denizen distinction. This restriction 
became apparent in a 1582 case, Hyde v. Hill.176 A husband and wife 
had gone abroad without license of the Crown or, perhaps, had stayed 
beyond the license.177 Attorney General John Popham and Solicitor 
General Thomas Egerton (later Lord Ellesmere) argued the case.178 
The Queen’s Bench judges concluded that, because of the absence of 
the Crown license, the issue were “alien	.	.	.	and not inheritable.”179 
The printed report emphasized that the absence of Crown license 
distinguished the case from the earlier cases confirming overseas 
children’s status.180 Although Calvin’s Case would shift attention to 
distinctions between Crown and Parliament, at the time of the earliest 
patents, Crown license appeared to be the relevant concern. Indeed, 
 
 172. CLIVE PARRY, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW AND THE HISTORY OF 
NATURALISATION 41 (1954), http://www.uniset.ca/naty/parry.htm#_ftnref212 
[http://perma.cc/8X9V-LPL7]. 
 173. See 42 Edw. 3, c. 10 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 389, 389. 
 174. LETTERS OF DENIZATION, supra note 136, at ii–iii (providing an English 
translation of letters patent of denization from the first year of Henry VIII). By the 
Elizabethan period, the language appears to have been relatively consistent. Id. at iv. For 
the different forms used, including those of other nations, see PARRY, supra note 133, at 
22–27. 
 175. LETTERS OF DENIZATION, supra note 136, at iv. 
 176. Valentine Hyde v. Hill (1582), 78 Eng. 270 (Q.B.). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 267 (listing personnel for Hilary Term). 
 179. Id. at 270. 
 180. Id.; HORACE BINNEY, THE ALIENIGENAE OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE 
PRESENT NATURALIZATION LAWS 8–9 (1853). 
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as Parry notes, “there was less uncertainty at this time as to the status 
of the overseas dominions of the Crown than there appear from 
Calvin’s Case to have existed immediately after the accession of 
James I.”181 
As English settlement overseas became a possibility in the 
sixteenth century, available legal sources provided reassurance about 
the status of children born overseas. If the Crown declared the lands 
in allegiance and if the parents were abroad pursuant to Crown 
license and in allegiance to the Crown, then children would be 
granted the same status as if born in England.182 The legal sources did 
not focus on whether the status acquired by such overseas children 
should be described as that of free denizens and natural subjects. 
They did not worry about defining a specific set of defined and 
circumscribed privileges and liberties. Instead the term, “as if born in 
England” promised a legal status defined by those who did not have 
to question at all their status.183 The inchoate group of liberties, 
franchises, and privileges belonging to those born in England would 
also belong to those born overseas. 
This account also may bear some relevance to the contemporary 
debate over the “natural born citizen” clause in the Constitution.184 
The status of overseas children in early English law is frequently a 
point of reference.185 This Article does not address this debate 
directly. Nonetheless, this Article’s discussion of overseas children 
implicitly cautions against over-interpretation of linguistic changes 
and over-reliance on Coke’s opinion. 
 
 181. PARRY, supra note 133, at 39. 
 182. See supra notes 145–55 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 156–61 and accompanying text. 
 184. U.S. CONST. art. II, §	1, cl. 5. 
 185. See, e.g., Neal Katyal & Paul Clement, On the Meaning of “Natural Born Citizen”, 
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 161, 161–62 (2015) (“As to British practice, laws in force in the 
1700s recognized that children born outside of the British Empire to subjects of the Crown 
were subjects themselves and explicitly used ‘natural born’ to encompass such children.”); 
Christina S. Lohman, Presidential-Eligibility: The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen 
Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 349, 364–66 (2000–2001) (discussing Calvin’s Case); Mary 
Bridgid McManamon, The Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood, 64 
CATH. U. L. REV. 317, 320–25 (2015) (discussing the 1350 statute and naturalization 
practices); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 27–28 (2008) (discussing Calvin’s Case and the 
English conception); Michael D. Ramsey, The Original Meaning of “Natural Born” (Jan. 
7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2712485 [https://perma.cc
/SF5W-JCJS] (discussing the 1350 statute applying to children born beyond the sea). 
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C. The Liberties Assurance 
The liberties assurance dates from the early letters patent to 
Humphrey Gilbert and Walter Raleigh. Although the words subtly 
changed among the various documents, the underlying purpose of the 
language did not alter. The concept was transmitted through the 
community and print publication. The specific language of the 1606 
Virginia charter was simply one of many versions of the liberties 
assurance. 
The liberties assurance first appeared in the letters patent to 
Humphrey Gilbert in 1578 by Queen Elizabeth.186 Earlier letters 
patent relating to overseas settlement did not contain such 
language.187 In 1578, the plans undertaken by Gilbert were the first to 
significantly address the legal issues raised by possible settlement. 
The men accompanying Gilbert contemplated bringing their 
“families” with the possibility of remaining there or returning when 
they wanted.188 They noted that “special privileges” would need to be 
established “to encourage women to go on the voyage.”189 The 
possibility of children born to English parents needed to be 
addressed. 
The Gilbert patent embraced the general legal framework within 
which overseas children would be treated as if born in England. All 
lands inhabited were to “bee of the allegiance” to the Queen and her 
heirs and successors.190 The people were to be “of our allegiance,” and 
“their heirs” would be born in England or Ireland or “within any 
 
 186. Patent Granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert by Elizabeth I (June 11, 1578), reprinted 
in 3 NEW AMERICAN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICA TO 
1612, at 186, 186 (David B. Quinn ed., 1979) [hereinafter 3 NEW AMERICAN WORLD]. 
 187. See, e.g., Grant to Several Merchants to be Called the Merchant Adventures of 
England (Feb. 26, 1555), in 2	CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS,	1554–1555, at 1, 55–59 
(1936). Although the 1502 patent to Hugh Elyot and others allowed “men and women” to 
dwell in the new lands, it did not address the status of overseas children. See Licence for 
Hugh Elyot et al. (Dec. 9, 1502) (authorizing rules for the “punishment of persons 
committing	.	.	.	rapine and rape of the women of the newly discovered lands against their 
will”), in 2	CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS, 1494–1509, at 1, 320–21 (1916); see 
also	J.H. BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 623 (discussing 
Company of Adventurers to the New Found Lands’ patent). 
 188. Petition of Sir George Peckham, and Sir Thomas Gerrard to Sir Francis 
Walsingham (June 1582), in 3 NEW AMERICAN WORLD, supra note 186, at 215, 215. 
 189. Id. at 217. 
 190. Patent Granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert by Elizabeth I, supra note 186, at 186–
87. Bancroft described the Gilbert patent: “To the people who might belong to his colony, 
the rights of Englishmen were promised.” 1 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE 
COLONIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 88 (15th ed. 1855). 
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other place within our allegiance.”191 In addition to allegiance, the 
people would inhabit under a Crown license. These persons then 
“shall, and may have, and enjoy all the privileges of free denizens and 
persons native of England, and within our allegiance.”192 The word 
“privileges” suggested the breadth of the acquired status. The phrase 
“free denizens and persons native of England” indicated that the 
letters patent confirmed privileges that were guaranteed by birth in 
England or by being made a free denizen, whether by Parliament or 
the Crown. The letters patent described the existing legal 
understanding of English liberties. 
Linguistic ambiguity was likely deliberate. In an effort involving 
settlement in Munster in Ireland, Gilbert and associates had favored 
semantic ambiguity.193 Originally in plans in 1569, disputes arose over 
“the definition of the people to be settled.”194 The future settlers 
wanted to be able to sell land to those in Ireland who were descended 
from Englishmen. As Michael MacCarthy-Morrogh notes, “[i]n the 
mid-sixteenth century ‘Englishmen’ often referred to any English-
speaking person, in Ireland as well as England.”195 He explains, “[t]he 
intention of the 1569 settlers had not been to extend justice to the 
local old English, but to give themselves the freedom to return to 
England, should they so choose, by leaving their lands in the hands of 
responsible men in Ireland.”196 In the 1580s, when the scheme to settle 
Munster was revived, the various drafts of the articles considered 
different descriptions. The Privy Council wanted the language to state 
that “the inhabitants of every family shall be of the birth of England”; 
the Irish Council preferred “all such as are descendants of Engl[ish] 
[name].”197 The “minute changes” and even a “clumsy alteration” 
were designed to satisfy various constituencies with varying objectives 
“without stating this harsh truth too plainly.”198 Thus linguistic 
ambiguity served contemporary purposes. 
Although the Gilbert letters patent did not include the phrase 
“as if born in England,” that language almost immediately appeared 
 
 191. Patent Granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert by Elizabeth I, supra note 186, at 187–
88. 
 192. Id. at 188. 
 193. See S.J. CONNOLLY, CONTESTED ISLAND: IRELAND, 1460–1630, at 263–64 (2007); 
MACCARTHY-MORROGH, supra note 114, at 20–21, 33. 
 194. MACCARTHY-MORROGH, supra note 114, at 33. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 33–34. They wanted to make sure that “new English, born in Ireland” would 
be able to participate. Id. at 34. 
 198. Id. 
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in a 1582 grant of Gilbert’s authority under the letters patent to 
another group.199 These settlers, some of whom were Catholic, 
contemplated bringing families with children.200 Although in theory 
the grant could only convey authority in Gilbert’s original patent, 
slightly different language was used. They “should and might have 
and enjoy all the privileges of free denizens and persons native of 
England and within her Majesty’s allegiance the such like ample 
manner and form as if they were borne and personally resiant within 
her highness’s said realm of England.”201 The phrase “ample manner 
and form” was new but added emphasis. The “as if born and 
personally resiant”—meaning abiding—was also new.202 Once again 
the phrase provided emphasis. If one were given the privileges of a 
person native to England, it had the same ultimate legal effect as 
being born and “resiant” in England. The new words—none of which 
changed the underlying concept save for adding emphasis—may have 
arisen from the particular concerns of the Catholic settlers. 
Despite providing reassurance about the status of overseas 
children, none of the ventures under Gilbert’s letters patent resulted 
in a settlement with children. In 1583, Gilbert made it as far as 
Newfoundland, but vanished in a storm on the return voyage.203 The 
language of the liberties assurance in the letters patent nonetheless 
became more widely known. Peckham printed an account of Gilbert’s 
voyages, A true reporte of the late discoveries	by Sir Humfrey 
Gilbert.204 The account described Gilbert’s reading of the patent; 
Gilbert “signified unto the company both strangers and others, that 
from thence forth, they were to live in that land, as the Territories 
appertaining to the Crowne of England.”205 Peckham’s account 
implied that any children born in the settlements would have had 
 
 199. Grant of Authority by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, of His Rights in America, to Sir 
John Gilbert, Sir George Peckham, and William Aucher (July 8, 1582), in 3 NEW 
AMERICAN WORLD, supra note 186, at 220, 220–23. 
 200. See KENNETH R. ANDREWS, TRADE, PLUNDER, AND SETTLEMENT 191 (1984) 
(“[The Catholic people] were expected to bring dependants who would take up farms of 
six-score acres	.	.	.	.”). 
 201. Grant of Authority by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, of His Rights in America, to Sir 
John Gilbert, Sir George Peckham, and William Aucher, supra note 199, at 222. 
 202. Resiant, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 706 (2d ed. 1989) (only later 
becoming “resident”). 
 203. See QUINN, supra note 93, at 8. 
 204. George Peckham, A True Report of the Late Discoveries (1583), in 12 THE 
PRINCIPAL NAVIGATIONS, VOYAGES, TRAFFIQUES, AND DISCOVERIES OF THE ENGLISH 
NATION 367, 367–73 (Edmund Goldsmid ed., 1889) (1589) [hereinafter 12 PRINCIPAL 
NAVIGATIONS]. 
 205. Id. at 367–68. 
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status as if born in England.206 In 1589, Richard Hakluyt printed the 
Gilbert patent in his book detailing the English voyages, The 
Principal Navigations.207 The Gilbert patent appeared to stand for the 
proposition that overseas children had English privileges and 
liberties. 
In 1584, Walter Raleigh’s letters patent contained a similar 
liberties assurance.208 Once again, the liberties phrase followed a 
declaration that the area was in allegiance to the crown. And once 
again, the people needed to be in allegiance and under license from 
the crown. The liberties assurance adopted the language of Gilbert’s 
grant to Peckham: 
Whether born in England, Ireland or any other place within our 
allegiance	.	.	.	they shall and may have all the privileges of free 
Denizens and persons native of England, and within our 
allegiance in such like ample manner and form as if they were 
born and personally resident with our said Realm of England.209 
The Raleigh patent was reviewed in draft by John Popham, then 
attorney general.210 Nothing essential was altered in the liberties 
assurance language.211 The patent’s language achieved wider 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. The Letters Patents Graunted by her Majesty to Sir Humfrey Gilbert (1578), 
reprinted in 12 PRINCIPAL NAVIGATIONS, supra note 204, at 306, 306–07. For an analysis 
of the author of Principal Navigations, see generally PETER C. MANCALL, HAKLUYT’S 
PROMISE: AN ELIZABETHAN’S OBSESSION FOR AN ENGLISH AMERICA (2007) (exploring 
Hakluyt’s life including his role in establishing colonies in the English Americas). 
 208. Letters Patent to Walter Raleigh (Mar. 25, 1584), reprinted in 3 NEW AMERICAN 
WORLD, supra note 186, at 268, 268–69. 
 209. Id. at 268–69 (spelling modernized). 
 210. See Letters Patent to Walter Raleigh, The National Archives, United Kingdom, 
PRO 30/34 (showing occasional textual alterations by Popham). The liberties assurance in 
the draft is the same as in the final letters patent in the Chancery Rolls. 
 211. Compare id. (stating “[a]nd we do grant to the said Sir R his heires and assignes 
and to all and evre of them and to all and evre other person or persons beinge of our 
alleageance whose names shall be noted or entered in some of our courtes of records 
within this our realme of England, and that with the assent of the said Sir R his heires or 
assignes shall [illegible word] in his iorneys for discoverye or in the second iorneys for 
conquest hereafter travel to such lands countryes or terrtoryes as aforesaid, and to their 
and evre of their heires, that they and everye or any of them, beinge ether borne within 
our said realmes of England, or Ireland, or in any other place within our allegeannce and 
wch hereafter shall be inhabiting within any the lands countries and terortories with such 
lycence as aforesaid shall and mae have and enioye all the priviledges of free denizens, and 
persons native of England, and within our alleageannce, in such ample manner and forme 
as yf they were borne and personallie restyant within our said realem of England any lawe 
custome or usage to the contrarye not withstandinge”), with Letters Patent to Walter 
Raleigh, reprinted in 3 NEW AMERICAN WORLD, supra note 186, at 268–69 (“And wee 
doe graunt to the syd Walter Ralegh, his heires, and assignes, and to all, and every of 
them, and to all, and every other person and persons, being of our allegiance, whose 
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circulation when Raleigh tried but failed to have the patent confirmed 
by parliamentary bill.212 
The birth of children in the Roanoke settlement made the 
liberties assurance meaningful.213 In August 1587, Virginia Dare was 
born to English parents, the grandchild of settlement leader, John 
White.214 She was not alone. An account of Roanoke published in 
Principal Navigations in 1589, listed “Children borne in Virginia.”215 
The two names listed, Virginia Dare and Haruye, testified to the 
vesting of the liberties assurance.216 In 1587, White left 114 settlers, 
including the children, behind when he sailed to England for 
supplies.217 Tragically, when he returned to Roanoke in 1590, the 
settlers had vanished.218 In 1602 and 1603, Raleigh sent expeditions to 
look for the settlers.219 Even as the Jamestown venture was being 
organized in 1606, the possibility existed that the first overseas 
children with English liberties remained alive.220 
The disappearance of Virginia Dare did not alter the belief that 
those born in the settlements had privileges as if born in England. 
White’s account was printed with a margin note describing Dare as 
 
names shall be noted or entred in some of our Courts of recorde within our Realme of 
England, that with the assent of the sayd Walter Ralegh, his heires or assignes, shall in his 
journeis for discoverie, or in the journeis for conquest hereafter travaile to such lands, 
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 212. See 3 NEW AMERICAN WORLD, supra note 186, at 270 (listing three committee 
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 214. Id. at 105–06. 
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the “first Christian born in Virginia.”221 As described in the popular 
play, Eastward Ho! (1605), “[t]he Virginia venture is central.”222 In 
the play, English status is conferred on the children of English settlers 
marrying members of tribes.223 One character asks whether Virginia is 
“inhabited already with any English?”224 The other man responds, 
“[a] whole country of English is there, man, bred of those that were 
left there in ‘79. They have married with the Indians, and make ‘em 
bring forth as beautiful faces as any we have in England.”225 
Further, as previously mentioned, the Raleigh patent with its 
emphatic liberties assurance was printed by Hakluyt in Principal 
Navigations.226 The language of the patent, reprinted by Hakluyt, 
promised that those born abroad would not face any problem in 
retaining rights as English people. Historian MacMillan notes, 
“[a]lthough neither Gilbert nor Raleigh were successful	.	.	.	these 
passages requiring allegiance, natural liberties, and legal systems not 
contrary to those in England would appear, with minor variation, in 
all of the Stuart patents as well.”227 These Elizabethan letters patent 
embedded the liberties assurance into the practice of settlement. 
Although the 1606 Virginia charter did not create the liberties 
assurance, it demonstrates how its drafters altered language to avoid 
difficulties without altering the underlying guarantee. James VI of 
Scotland’s accession to the English throne as James I at the end of 
March 1603 made words such as “subject” and “denizen” freighted 
with complicated meanings.228 The desirable status was that which 
came with birth in England. An unanswered question was whether 
the Scots would have such equivalent status confirmed. 
 
 221. To the Aduenturers, Fauourers, and Welwillers of the Enterprise for the 
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Initially, commissioners proposed that subjects born in either 
nation would be “mutually naturalized.”229 From 1604 on, the debate 
continued in Parliament, among judges and civil and common 
lawyers, and “throughout the country.”230 Various theories were 
proposed over the “relation between king and subject.”231 Chancellor 
Ellesmere explained in his published opinion in Calvin’s Case, 
“[t]here have been alleged many definitions, descriptions, 
distinctions, differences, divisions, subdivisions, allusion of words, 
extension of words, construction of words; and nothing left 
unsearched to find what is ligeantia, allegiantia, fides, obedientia, 
subjuectio, subdit; and who be aborigines, indigenae, alienigena, 
advneticij, denizati &c.”232 In addition to the James I accession, other 
contemporary debates brought scrutiny on particular words used to 
describe preferred status. For example, during these same years, the 
London court of Common Council restricted apprenticeships 
available to children of persons designated as “denizens.”233 The 
debate remained contentious through 1606. 
Drafted against the background of the debate, the 1606 Virginia 
charter subtly altered the liberties assurance of the Raleigh letters 
patent.234 The reference to persons in allegiance became the more 
contemporary “persons being our subjects.”235 With the Roanoke 
settlers possibly still alive, “lands, countries, and territories” became 
“several Colonies and plantations.”236 Privileges “in such like ample 
manner and form” was rewritten as the broad “Liberties, Franchises 
and Immunities.”237 “Born and personally resiant” was updated as 
“abiding and born.”238 None of these changes were substantive but 
together they adapted the liberties assurance to the demands of 
contemporary politics. 
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 236. Compare Letters Patent to Walter Raleigh, supra note 208, at 268, with infra text 
accompanying note 290 (spelling modernized). 
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The most troubling phrase in light of the Scots debate, “free 
denizens, and persons native of England,” was simply omitted.239 
Read literally, the 1606 charter was somewhat incoherent. The 
desired liberties had usually been described under the terms of the 
fourteenth century statutes and forms used in denization letters 
patent. Those particular words, however, inconveniently overlapped 
with the contentious legal issue—would persons not “native of 
England” or “free denizens” have the liberties of the English? 
Deletion of the phrase sidestepped the awkwardness. This excision 
again adapted the liberties assurance to the new world under James I. 
The man—or men—responsible for these drafting changes is 
unknown. There is no known evidence to attribute it to Coke. The 
changes could have been made in the initial draft presented by the 
Company. It could have been the other legal luminary more involved 
with the Virginia project, John Popham. In fact, fifty years after 
Popham’s death, contemporary Ferdinando Gorges stated that: “[H]is 
Lordship [Sir John Popham, Lord Chief Justice] failed not to interest 
many of the lords and others to be [p]etitioners” on the patent.”240 
Popham’s commitment to the Virginia settlement led an early 
American historian to describe the 1606 Virginia charter as given 
“[u]nder the management, it seems, of Sir John Popham.”241 Popham 
seems to have been aware of the issues raised by the Scots question 
and, to the extent that anyone wanted the charter to avoid any 
difficulties, he might have suggested the linguistic changes. The 
changes could have been the product of a discussion among Coke and 
Popham. The changes could have been the suggestion of someone 
completely lost to history. But nothing about the omission indicates a 
predetermination of the issues in Calvin’s Case. 
D. The Influence of Calvin’s Case 
The legal debates over the status of the Scots occurred, and 
developed rapidly, after the Virginia charter’s spring 1606 issuance. 
Calvin’s Case had an influence on the liberties assurance, but a 
different one than has been implied in the traditional account. The 
case seems to have influenced the 1609 Virginia charter ironically by 
 
 239. Compare Letters Patent to Walter Raleigh, supra note 208, at 268, with infra text 
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 240. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, A Description of New-England (1658), in 2 SIR 
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reassuring the community that it could return to the original “free 
denizens” phrase. It would be the 1609 charter that became a model 
for later charters. 
Calvin’s Case was initiated only after the Virginia charter was 
issued. Indeed, Robert Calvin was not born until after November 3, 
1606.242 That November, Parliament debated at length the question of 
the postnati.243 Then, Coke became Chief Justice of Common Pleas in 
June 1606.244 As Sir John Baker notes, Coke’s notebooks during this 
time contained “numerous notes of things Popham had told him.”245 
Thus, disentangling Coke’s thoughts from Popham’s influence is 
difficult when studying this period. 
In any event, the judges issued advisory opinions in February 
1607; despite almost unanimous reasoning by the judges about the 
legal status of the postnati as subjects of James I, pressures from the 
House of Commons made it politically preferable to have a definitive 
decision from the various law courts.246 A case was brought to decide 
the issue, and Francis Bacon argued for Calvin.247 Almost a year later, 
the case was decided in favor of Calvin and the postnati,248 with Coke 
publishing his opinion soon afterwards.249 Ultimately, Calvin’s Case 
and the subsequent Coke and Ellesmere publications removed 
concerns about the liberties assurance. 
In 1609, a second Virginia charter was issued with a slightly more 
modern liberties assurance.250 This second charter adopted some of 
the 1606 charter’s alterations. It similarly substituted “Liberties, 
Franchises, and Immunities” for the earlier description of privileges 
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in an ample manner and form.251 It retained the term “[s]ubject” for 
persons in allegiance.252 It used “as if they had been abiding and born” 
instead of the older “born and personally resident.”253 And the 1609 
charter made a small new alteration. Where the 1606 charter had 
referred to persons “and every of their children[,]” the 1609 charter 
now clarified the infiniteness of the guarantee by stating that it 
extended to “every [of] their Children and Posterity.”254 These 
changes modernized the earlier phrases, but again did so without 
changing the underlying commitment. 
Most importantly, the 1609 charter returned to the earlier 
linguistic phrase, free denizens. Instead of copying the most significant 
omission in the 1606 charter—the one that created the illusion that 
the charter represented a foreshadowing of Calvin’s Case—the 1609 
charter adopted pre-1606 language. The Raleigh patent had described 
“free Denizens and persons native of England.”255 The 1609 charter 
employed “free denizens and natural-subjects,” substituting “natural-
subjects” in place of “persons native to England.”256 The emphasis on 
“subjects” was a sensible adaptation in the wake of the entire political 
debate over the Scots and Calvin’s Case. However the other phrase, 
“free denizens,” made little sense if Coke’s opinion in Calvin’s Case 
had restated existing legal differences between free denizens and 
natural subjects.257 Instead, the 1609 charter suggested the distinction, 
so prominent in that case, did not matter. Indeed, a prior provision in 
the charter described “subjects” as “[s]ubjects, naturally born, or 
[d]enizens, or others.”258 Thus, the charter ignored the Cokean 
distinctions. 
E. The Liberties Assurance in Later Charters 
After the 1609 Virginia charter, this approach to language in the 
liberties assurance continued. Words occasionally changed to update 
the provision to contemporary circumstances but the concept 
remained the same. The letters patent and charters that followed 
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from 1610 to 1620 retained the odd “free denizen and natural subject” 
modifier. The 1615 Somers Island (Bermuda) letters patent and 1620 
New England letters patent were identical to the 1609 second 
charter.259 The 1610 Newfoundland letters patent had “liberties” as 
well as “franchises and immunities.”260 Not surprisingly, given the 
history of Calvin’s Case, the term “denizen” may have been too 
troubling to the Scots. The 1621 Latin charter to Sir William 
Alexander for New Scotland altered the phrase, converting it to “free 
and native subjects of our kingdom of Scotland.”261 Elsewhere, 
however, free denizen retained coherence as a category. The 1623 
Charter of Avalon to George Calvert conferred “all the priviledges of 
England as if they were born in England” as the marginalia termed 
the lengthy list.262 The charter described those born as “Denizens and 
Lieges”; the marginalia used the term “Denizens.”263 As in the earliest 
Gilbert letters patent, the charter first declared the land in 
allegiance.264 The lengthy list gave rights to own and inherit land and 
all property, and “libertyes franchises priviledges.”265 
Not until 1629 did “denizen” vanish from the liberties assurance. 
The omissions may relate to the influential 1628 publication of Coke 
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on Littleton.266 In the section on aliens, Coke acknowledged that 
“denizen” could refer to one born “within the king’s allegiance.”267 
However, he then went on to add, “[b]ut many times in acts of 
parliament, denizen is taken for an alien born, that is enfranchised or 
denizated by letters patent.”268 The last sentence of the section 
prominently emphasized the difference for overseas children. Coke 
wrote, “[s]o if an issue of an Englishman be born beyond sea if the 
issue be naturalized by act of parliament, he shall inherit his father’s 
lands; but if he be made denizen by letters patent, he shall not; and 
many other differences there be between them.”269 The popular 
treatise’s explicit statement that denizen was a lesser status likely 
rendered the word unusable. 
One of the earliest examples of this new trend appeared in the 
Massachusetts Bay charter. While the drafters deleted “denizen,” 
they left “free.”270 With that change, the phrase became the modern 
“free and natural subjects.”271 “Free” now modified subjects; it no 
longer was a description of denizens. The Maryland (1632), 
Connecticut (1662), and Rhode Island (1663) charters followed suit.272 
These charters also followed the 1629 Massachusetts Bay charter’s 
approach of “liberties and immunities.”273 The approach remained 
throughout the seventeenth century. The 1691 Massachusetts Bay 
royal charter provided that those subjects born in Massachusetts 
would have the “liberties and immunities of free and natural subjects” 
as if “born within this our realm of England.”274 
The liberties assurance had acquired a cultural valence: free 
liberties, free subjects, and free born. The assurance appeared even 
where there was no charter granted by the crown. In 1636, the settlers 
in Plymouth, Massachusetts (commonly referred to as “the Pilgrims”) 
drafted a legal code known as “The General Fundamentals.”275 They 
described themselves as “coming hither as free born Subjects of the 
Kingdom of England, Endowed with all and singular the Privileges 
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belonging to such	.	.	.	.”276 The text of the General Fundamentals then 
proceeded with privileges based on Magna Carta, with the first law 
declaring that laws were to be passed by freemen lawfully 
assembled.277 The practice was “according to the free Liberties of the 
free born People of England.”278 Governing officers were to be 
elected by the freemen, justice was to be equally and impartially 
administered, and there would be due process and trial by jury.279 The 
liberties assurance seemed increasingly to have been considered 
inherent in the very concept of an English colony. William Penn’s 
1681 charter for Pennsylvania contained no such explicit assurance.280 
Penn was a proponent of Magna Carta’s relevance to the colonies and 
responsible for the first American printing of Magna Carta.281 Thus, it 
seems Penn assumed that Pennsylvanians inherently possessed 
English liberties. 
By the early eighteenth century, the written liberties assurance 
had become a mere placeholder for the constitutional concept. The 
drafters of the last of the colonial charters—the 1732 Georgia 
charter—returned to older language of “free denizen.”282 The charter 
declared that all persons born in Georgia and their children and 
posterity would “have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and 
immunities of free denizens and natural born subjects	.	.	.	as if abiding 
and born within this our kingdom of Great-Britain or any other of our 
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dominions.”283 Although “free denizen” had vanished almost a 
century earlier from colonial charters, it appears drafters did not 
worry that its absence or reaffirmance would be taken seriously. The 
liberties assurance had become inherent in the legal framework of the 
English colonies, and in the colonists themselves. 
IV.  CHARTER CONSTITUTIONALISM 
What do we make of the history of the most important clause in 
the colonial charters—the one that reassured generations of those 
settling in the colonies that they possessed the same liberties as 
English people? Over the years, the precise words of the liberties 
assurance changed to comply with contemporary sensibilities. Yet, as 
this essay suggests, the underlying concept remained constant. In 
these charters, words mattered, and yet, they also did not matter. 
The underlying concept was simple and simultaneously hard to 
express. The desire was to ensure that those born in the colonies 
would have the same liberties as if born in England. If the letters 
patent and charters had not included such words, perhaps the same 
liberties would have existed. However, at the outset of English 
settlement, how the legal arguments would have played out is not 
clear. It was simply practical to make sure that no one would have to 
request Parliament or the Privy Council to confer status on a child. 
Repeatedly at this symposium, scholars touched on the mythic 
notion of Magna Carta—the sense that the spirit of Magna Carta as 
understood by Americans differed from its history and text. Even 
within the legal history of Magna Carta, as Richard Helmholz and 
Charles Donahue noted, Magna Carta was interpreted with respect to 
an underlying principle, equity, or concept, rather than limited by the 
text of the words.284 As the English settlements expanded and as 
seventeenth-century political disputes gave new meaning to Magna 
Carta, the Great Charter stood as an example of the possibility that 
words represented principles, but that the principles were not defined 
and limited entirely by the words. Charter constitutionalism was 
perhaps reinforced by this growing cultural sensibility. 
The liberties assurance reflected a broad cultural acceptance of 
this approach to constitutional text. It also reveals the limits of the 
modern constitutional interpretive framework in understanding early 
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constitutionalism. Various scholars have suggested that the 
interpretive rules that governed early American constitutionalism 
differed from those rules in vogue at the turn of the twenty-first 
century.285 Using different rhetorical labels, this scholarship has 
indicated that early American constitutionalism read text in a looser 
manner. As the liberties assurance indicates, modern American 
constitutionalism developed out of this approach. 
In the end, Edward Coke did not single handedly transfer Magna 
Carta across the Atlantic in the 1606 Virginia charter. It is appealing 
to believe that American constitutionalism began with a first framer 
and therefore the narrative surrounding that mythical framer allows 
us to tell a seamless story of 800 years of Magna Carta. The reality is 
less straightforward, and yet more important. Americans acquire the 
liberties associated with English subjects, among them Magna Carta, 
because a legal and political community repeatedly wrote documents 
that insisted on that assurance. They believed in liberties as a 
birthright. For them, the words were mere placeholders for the 
concept. The charters in which they inscribed these concepts became 
the progenitors of written state constitutions and eventually the U.S. 
Constitution. Somewhere lurking inside modern American 
constitutionalism, perhaps in the liberties provisions, is a remnant of 
charter constitutionalism. By reclaiming this most early history, the 
legitimate interpretive possibilities of American constitutionalism 
become more expansive. 
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Appendix: Liberties Assurances in Letters Patent and Charters286 
 
1578 Gilbert287: to all and every other person and persons, being 
of our allegiance	.	.	.	and to their and every of their heires: that they 
and every or any of them being either borne within our sayd Realmes 
of England or Ireland, or within any other place within our allegiance, 
and which hereafter shall be inhabiting within any the lands, 
countreys and territories, with such licence as aforesaid, shall and may 
have, and enjoy all the priveleges of free denizens and persons native 
of England, and within our allegiance	.	.	.	. 
 
1582 Gilbert’s grant to John Gilbert, George Peckham, and 
others288: all and every other persone and persones beinge of her 
highnes allegeaunce	.	.	.	and their and every of their heires that they 
and every of them beinge either borne within her Majesties said 
realmes of England or Ireland or in any other place within her 
highnes allegeaunces and which thereafter should be inhabitinge 
within anye the landes countries and territories with such licence as 
aforesaid should and myghte have and enjoye all the priveleges of free 
denizens and persones native of England and within her Majesties 
allegeaunce the such like ample manner and forme as yf they were 
borne and personallie resiant within her hyghnes said realme of 
England any lawe custome or usage to the contrarie not with 
standinge	.	.	.	. 
 
1584 Raleigh289: all and euery other person, and persons being of 
our allegiance	.	.	.	and to their, and to euery of their heires, that they, 
and every or any of them, being either borne within our saide 
Realmes of Englande, or Irelande, or in any other place within our 
allegiance, and which hereafter shall be inhabiting within any the 
lands, Countreis, and territories, with such licence (as aforesaide) 
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shall and may haue all the priuiledges of free Denizens, and persons 
natiue of England, and within our allegiance in such like ample maner 
and fourme, as if they were borne and personally resident within our 
saide Realme of England	.	.	.	. 
 
1606 Virginia290: all and every the Persons being our Subjects, 
which shall dwell and inhabit within every or any of the said several 
Colonies and Plantations, and every of their children, which shall 
happen to be born within any of the Limits and Precincts of the said 
several Colonies and Plantations, shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties, 
Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Dominions, to all 
Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, within this 
our Realm of England, or any other of our said Dominions. 
 
1609 Virginia291: all and every the Persons being our Subjects, 
which shall go and inhabit within the said Colony and Plantation, and 
every their Children and Posterity, which shall happen to be borne 
within any of the Limits thereof, shall HAVE and ENJOY all 
Liberties, Franchizes, and Immunities of Free Denizens and natural 
Subjects within any of our other Dominions to all Intents and 
Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born within this our Realm 
of England, or in any other of our Dominions. 
 
1610 Newfoundland292: all and every the persons being our 
subjects which shall go and inhabit within any colony	.	.	.	and every of 
their children and posterity which that shall happen to be born within 
the limits thereof shall enjoy	.	.	.	all liberties	.	.	.	of free denizens and 
natural subjects within any of our other dominions to all intents and 
purposes as if they had been abiding and born within this our Realm of 
England	.	.	.	. 
 
1615 Bermuda293: [nearly identical to 1609 Virginia]. 
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 293. Letters Patent of James I for Somers Islands (1615), reprinted in 1 MEMORIALS OF 
THE DISCOVERY AND EARLY SETTLEMENT OF THE BERMUDAS OR SOMERS ISLANDS 
1515–1687, at 83, 94 (J.H. Lefroy ed., 1877).  
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1620 New England294: [nearly identical to 1609 Virginia]. 
 
1621 William Alexander295: declare, decree, and ordain that all 
our subjects, going to the said New Scotland, or living in it, and all 
their children and posterity born there, and all adventuring, there 
shall have and enjoy all the liberties, rights, and privileges of free and 
native subjects of our kingdom of Scotland, or of our other dominions, 
as if they had been born there. 
 
1623 Avalon296: that the said Province shall be of our allegiance. 
And that all, and singular the subjects and liege people of us our 
Heires and Successors transported into the said Province and their 
Children there already borne or hereafter to be borne Be and shall be 
Denizens and Leiges of us our heires and Successors, and be in all 
things held treated, reputed and esteemed as Liege and Faithfull 
people of us, our heires and successors borne within our Kingdome of 
England And likewise any Lands, Tenements, Revenue, Services, and 
other Hereditaments whatsoever within our Kingdome of England or 
other our Dominions, may purchase, receive, take, have, hold, buy 
and possesse, and them to occupy and enjoye, give, sell, alien and 
bequeath. As likewise all Liberties, Franchises and priviledges of this 
our Kingdom of England, freely, quietly, and peaceably have and 
possess, occupy and enjoy as our Liege people, borne or to be borne 
within our said Kingdome of England, without the Lett Molestacon, 
vexation, trouble or offence of us our heires and successors 
whomsoever Any statute, Act, Ordinance or Provision to the contrary 
hereof notwithstanding. 
 
1629 Mass Bay297: all and every the Subjects of Us, our Heires or 
Successors, which shall goe to and inhabite within the saide Landes 
 
 294. The Charter of New England (1620), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 1827, 1839 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 3 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. 
 295. Royal Charter of New Scotland in Favor of Sir William Alexander by James I 
(1621), reprinted in SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER AND AMERICAN COLONIZATION 127, 143 
(Edmund F. Slafter ed., Carlos Slafter trans., 1873) (emphasis added) (English 
translation). 
 296. COLLECTION AND COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS OF 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NEWFOUNDLAND, supra note 262, at 50–51 (emphasis added). 
 297. The Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629), reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 294, at 1856 (emphasis added). 
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and Premisses hereby men[cio]ed to be graunted, and every of their 
Children which shall happen to be borne there, or on the Seas in 
goeing thither, or retorning from thence, shall have and enjoy all 
liberties and Immunities of free and naturall Subjects within any of the 
Domynions of Vs, our Heires or Successors, to all Intents, 
Construc[cio]ns, and Purposes whatsoever, as yf they and everie of 
them were borne within the Realme of England. 
 
1629 Heath (Carolina)298: the said Province be in our Allegiance 
& that all & every our subjects	.	.	.	brought or to be brought into the 
said Province, their children either their already borne or hereafter to 
be borne are & shall be Naturall and leiges to us our Heires & 
successors & in all things shall be held, treated reputed & accounted 
as faithfull leiges of us, our heires & successors borne in our Kingdom 
of England. And alsoe that they shall possesse lands, tenements, rents 
services & Hereditaments whatsoever with our Kingdome of England 
& other our Dominions to purchase, receive, take, have, hold, buy 
and possesse & them to use & enjoy & alsoe then to give sell alienate 
& bequeath & alsoe all libertyes, franchises & privileges of this our 
Realme, to have & possess freely quietly & peaceably & that they may 
use & enjoy them as our leiges borne or to be borne within our 
Kingdom of England	.	.	.	. 
 
1632 Maryland299: that the said Province be of our Allegiance; 
and that all and singular the Subjects and Liege-Men of Us, our Heirs 
and Successors, transplanted, or hereafter to be transplanted into the 
Province aforesaid, and the Children of them, and of others their 
Descendants, whether already born there, or hereafter to be born, be 
and shall be Natives and Liege-Men of Us, our Heirs and Successors, 
of our Kingdom of England and Ireland; and in all Things shall be 
held, treated, reputed, and esteemed as the faithful Liege-Men of Us, 
and our Heirs and Successors, born within our Kingdom of England; 
also Lands, Tenements, Revenues, Services, and other Hereditaments 
whatsoever, within our Kingdom of England, freely, quietly, and 
peaceably to have and possess, and the same may use and enjoy in the 
same manner as our Liege-Men born, or to be born within our said 
 
 298. Sir Robert Heath’s Patent 5 Charles 1st (Oct. 30, 1629) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 69, at 69, 72–73. 
 299. The Charter of Maryland (1632) (emphasis added), reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 294, at 1681. 
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Kingdom of England, without Impediment, Molestation, Vexation, 
Impeachment, or Grievance	.	.	.	. 
 
1639 Maine300: all and every the persons being the subjects of us 
our heires and successors which shall goe or inhabite within the said 
Province and Premisses or any of them and all and everie the children 
and posteritie discending of English Scottish or Irish Parents which 
shall happen to be borne within the same or uppon the seas in passing 
thither or from thence from henceforth ought to bee and shalbee 
taken and reputed to bee of the alleagiance of us our heires and 
successors and shalbee and soe shalbee forever hereafter esteemed to 
bee the naturall borne subjects of us our heires and successors and 
shall bee able to pleade and bee ympleaded and shall have power and 
bee able to take by discent purchase or otherwise Landes Tenements 
and Hereditaments and shall have and injoy all Liberties Francheses 
and Immunityes of or belonging to any the naturall borne subjects of 
this our Kingdome of England within this our Kingdome and within all 
other of our Domynions to all intents and purposes as if they had beene 
abydeing and borne within this our Kingdome or any other of our 
Dominions	.	.	.	. 
 
1662 Connecticut301: [nearly identical to 1629 Mass Bay]. 
 
1663 Rhode Island302: [nearly identical to 1629 Mass Bay]. 
 
1663 Carolina303: the said province of Carolina, shall be of our 
allegiance, and that all and singular the subjects and liege people of 
us, our heirs and successors, transported or to be transported into the 
said province, and the children of them and of such as shall descend 
from them, there born or hereafter to be born, be and shall be 
denizons and lieges of us, our heirs and successors of this our kingdom 
 
 300. Grant of the Province of Maine (1639) (emphasis added), reprinted in 3 FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 294, at 1625, 1635. 
 301. Charter of Connecticut (1662) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 69, at 529, 533. 
 302. Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663), reprinted in 6 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3211, 3220 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
 303. Charter of Carolina (1663) (emphasis added), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 2743, 2747 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
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of England, and be in all things held, treated, and reputed as the liege 
faithful people of us, our heirs and successors, born within this our 
said kingdom, or any other of our dominions, and may inherit or 
otherwise purchase and receive, take, hold, buy and possess any 
lands, tenements or hereditaments within the same places, and them 
may occupy, possess and enjoy, give, sell, aliene and bequeathe; as 
likewise all liberties, franchises and priviledges of this our kingdom of 
England, and of other our dominions aforesaid, and may freely and 
quietly have, possess and enjoy, as our liege people born within the 
same, without the least molestation, vexation, trouble or grievance of 
us, our heirs and successors	.	.	.	. 
 
1691 Massachusetts Bay304: [nearly identical to 1629 Mass Bay] 
 
1732 Georgia305: all and every the persons which shall happen to 
be born within the said province, and every of their children and 
posterity, shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities 
of free denizens and natural born subjects, within any of our 
dominions, to all intents and purposes, as if abiding and born within 
this our kingdom of Great-Britain, or any other of our dominions	.	.	.	. 
 
 
 304. The Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1691) (emphasis added), reprinted in 3 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 294, at 1625, 1870, 1880–81. 
 305. Charter of Georgia (1732), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 282, at 765, 773. 
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